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Mr. Chairman, ranking member Clarke, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate
the opportunity to testify today on the benefits for small business of regulations that protect
public health, worker and consumer safety, and the environment.
I could not agree more with the Subcommittee’s overarching mission: strengthening the
role of small business in repairing an economy ruined by rampant speculation and the excessive
greed of financial institutions that Attorney General Eric Holder has embarrassingly implied are
too big to prosecute. Rather than take an honest look at how weak regulation allowed Wall
Street to engineer the 2008 crash, big business uses small business as a kind of human shield,
conflating the distinctly different needs in the two sectors and pushing for deregulation that could
further endanger the economy and public health.
A case in point is the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of Advocacy, which
has consciously diverted its limited, taxpayer-funded resources away from helping truly small
business understand and comply with regulatory requirement toward pursuing the complaint du
jour of the very large companies that call the shots at the American Chemistry Council, the
National Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. These activities
raise the disturbing prospect that the Office of Advocacy has broken the law. In fact, I hope
that the evidence I put before you today will motivate you to ask the Government Accountability
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Office (GAO) to investigate the SBA Office of Advocacy regarding its compliance with laws
that (1) bar federally funded agencies from lobbying Congress and (2) require it to conduct its
affairs in the sunshine. We hope you will also ask GAO to investigate how the Office of
Advocacy ensures that its intervention in individual rulemakings genuinely advance the interests
of truly small businesses. From what we can tell, it routinely intervenes in rulemakings with
only tangential effects on its constituency.
I am a law professor at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law and the
President of the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) (http://www.progressivereform.org/).
Founded in 2002, CPR is a network of sixty scholars across the nation dedicated to protecting
health, safety, and the environment through analysis and commentary. We have a small
professional staff funded by foundations. I joined academia mid-career, after working for the
Federal Trade Commission for seven years and the House Energy and Commerce Committee for
five years. For seven years, I served as the lawyer for small, publicly-owned electric systems
that have much in common with the businesses under your jurisdiction. My work on
environmental regulation includes four books, and over thirty articles (as author or co-author).
My most recent book, published by the University of Chicago Press, is The People's Agents and
the Battle to Protect the American Public: Special Interests, Government, and Threats to Health,
Safety, and the Environment, co-authored with Professor Sidney Shapiro of Wake Forest
University’s School of Law, which comprehensively analyzes the state of the regulatory system
that protects public health, worker and consumer safety, and natural resources, and concludes
that these agencies are under-funded, lack adequate legal authority, and consistently are
undermined by political pressure motivated by special interests in the private sector. I have
served as consultant to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and testified before
Congress many times.
My testimony today makes four points:
Small business deserves assistance regarding compliance with regulatory requirements
and the SBA Office of Advocacy ought to provide this assistance rather than operating
as an institutionalized opponent of regulations targeted by its big business cronies.
Two recent reports by CPR and the Center for Effective Government reveal that the
Office of Advocacy systematically ignores the needs of small business and instead
operates, largely in secret, as a loyal foot soldier in the big business campaign against
regulation.
Regulation is vital to the quality of life we take for granted in America, saving lives,
preserving health, and safeguarding the natural environment for our children.
If anything, our regulatory system is dangerously weak, and Congress should focus on
reviving it rather than eroding public protections.
The Disgraceful Track Record of the SBA Office of Advocacy
As you are no doubt aware, Congress established the SBA in 1953 to safeguard the
interests of small business in an economy buffeted by World War II and the Korean War.
Legitimate concerns about the competitive disadvantages that small business faced during
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wartime motivated the establishment of broadly based effort to ensure small business access to
federal procurement contracts and to conduct specialized outreach to women, people of color,
and veterans.
The SBA Office of Advocacy was created in 1976 to represent small business before
federal agencies. To the extent that the Office of Advocacy’s role in the rulemaking process is to
ensure that the concerns of truly small businesses are raised before agencies, this limited mission
makes sense. After all, truly small businesses don’t have the resources to represent their interests
in Washington. And those interests are often quite distinct from the big business with which
they compete.
Unfortunately, the Office of Advocacy has strayed far from this mission, as explained in
two particularly shocking investigative reports I have attached to my testimony. The reports
reveal that the SBA Office of Advocacy has systematically consorted with big business to pursue
an agenda of undercutting health, safety and environmental agencies without considering at any
point whether the way its staff spend their time confers any benefit on small business. The
Office of Advocacy succeeds only in echoing the complaints voiced by well-heeled lobbyists
representing the wealthiest companies and most powerful trade groups in the country.
Meanwhile, the legitimate concerns of truly small businesses continue to be drowned out.
The first report, authored by the Center for Effective Government (CEG), describes how
the Office of Advocacy hosts regular “Environmental Roundtables” that are attended by trade
association representatives and lobbyists. The meetings are held at law firms that represent
organizations like the American Chemistry Council, and feature presentations by lobbyists and
lawyers who represent Fortune 100 companies. They occur behind closed doors and their
agendas, attendance lists, and minutes are not published. Nevertheless, the roundtables result in
positions that become the Office of Advocacy’s policy positions.
Alerted by the CEG’s report, environmental organization representatives attempted to
participate in a roundtable, but were told that they could listen to the discussion but were not
allowed to speak. (See Richard Denison, Environmental Defense Fund, “A mission corrupted:
Your tax dollars pay for ACC to coach big industry on how to undercut EPA’s IRIS program,”
http://blogs.edf.org/nanotechnology/2013/03/05/a-mission-corrupted-your-tax-dollars-pay-foracc-to-coach-big-industry-on-how-to-undercut-epas-iris-program/) The roundtable consisted of
presentations by Nancy Beck, a former White House Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) staffer who now works for the American Chemistry Council, and Robert
Fensterheim, a former American Petroleum Industry staffer who now works at the RegNet/IRIS
Forum, an industry group dedicated to undermining EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System
(IRIS).
The IRIS program compiles toxicological profiles of chemicals sold in large quantities in
commerce, or otherwise threatening public health and the environment. Its profiles do not have
regulatory effect, although large chemical manufacturers are very sensitive to their potential to
reveal a chemical’s toxicity. Given all the decisions that affect small business today, it is
mystifying why the chemical industry’s campaign against IRIS implicates the interests of more
than a tiny handful of small businesses and, in fact, the CEG report finds no evidence that the
Office of Advocacy received any request or comment from its ostensible constituency before
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pursuing these issues. As the CEG report explains, these activities, especially the sponsorship of
the secretive roundtables, appear to violate the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).
Correspondence received in response to a CEG Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request reveals that the SBA Office of Advocacy played a leading role in the American
Chemistry Council’s crusade to halt the Department of Health and Human Service’s National
Toxicology Program’s efforts to list chemicals as “known” or “probable” carcinogens, in
probable violation of the Anti-Lobbying Act and other lobbying restrictions. Once again, there is
no evidence that the Office of Advocacy consulted with any small businesses in emphasizing
these issues.
The Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) report, released in tandem with the CEG’s
investigative findings, found that the Office of Advocacy defines “small” businesses as any oil
refinery that has up to 1,500 employees and any chemical plant that has up to 1,000 employees.
This strange approach allows it to push for preferential regulatory treatment for relatively large
firms that do not conform to any common sense understanding of what a “small business” is.
This approach further obscures its efforts to win approval from big business in regulatory battles
that have at best a marginal impact on small business interests. As just one example, CPR
reports on the Office of Advocacy’s enthusiastic participation in a rulemaking designed to reduce
emissions of hazardous air pollutants such as arsenic, lead, and formaldehyde from coal-fired
power plants. The Office of Advocacy argued to the EPA that the rule should be cut back to
cover only mercury emissions. Its arguments closely tracked those made in a 200-page
submission from the Southern Company, the fourth largest utility in the country.
CPR’s report makes a crucial observation with regard to the Office of Advocacy’s
aggressive deregulatory efforts: by taking consistently hostile stances to health and safety
rulemaking proposals, it sacrifices any opportunity to work with the agencies in an effort to
mitigate the impact of the proposals on truly small businesses. We understand the reasons for
this approach, and they aren’t pretty. Rewriting the comments prepared by big law firms for
even bigger companies is far easier than rolling up your sleeves and working with agency
officials to design innovative compliance alternatives.
The report recommends that the Office of Advocacy restore its focus on helping truly
small businesses—that is, those firms with 20 or fewer employees. Second, it recommends a
new mission for the Office of Advocacy: promoting win-win regulatory solutions that help small
businesses achieve protective regulatory standards without undermining their ability to compete
with larger firms.
The Benefits of Regulation
Self-righteous crusaders against regulation have become accustomed to telling only half
the story to the American people: they pretend that exaggerated regulatory costs are the only
result of the system, and ignore its considerable benefits. Conversely, they suggest that if we
dismantled the regulatory system, we would suffer no negative consequences and instead reap a
windfall in saved money. This devious approach is like setting out to balance a family budget,
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stockpiling all the available money (pay checks, investments, or social security), and ignoring
whatever you are able to buy (a place to live, leisure pursuits, or a college education).
What does it mean to leave the benefits side of the ledger blank? Because the benefits of
regulation are spread throughout the population, to every man, woman, and child in America—
regardless of class, race, background, or ethnicity—this myopic focus on the costs to regulatory
industries raises the question of which group of citizens is more important—stockholders and
brokers or everyday people who need clean air and water, safe workplaces and products, and
financial and health care systems free of price gouging and other forms of fraud. Should the
second group risk grave harm so that the first group can maximize profits, or is there a better
way?
Just ask anyone whose life was saved by a seat belt, whose children escaped brain
damage because the EPA took lead out of gas, who turns on the faucet knowing the water will be
clean, who takes drugs for a chronic illness confident the medicine will make them better, who
avoided having their hand mangled in machinery on the job because an emergency switch was
there to cut off the motor, who has taken their kids on a trip to a heritage national park to see a
bald eagle that was saved from the brink of extinction—the list goes on and on.
The simple fact is that people need to be healthy enough to go to work and school. To
use the example of the benefits achieved by the EPA, the agency that has served as the poster
child for supposed regulatory excess: in 2010, clean air rules saved 164,300 adult lives. By
2020, they will save 237,000 lives annually. These rules save 13 million days of work loss due
to pollution-related illnesses like asthma, and 3.2 million days of school loss. By 2020, they will
save 17 million work loss days and 5.4 million school loss days. The economic value of Clean
Air Act regulatory controls are estimated to be $2 trillion annually by 2020, dwarfing $65 billion
in compliance costs. 1
Previous Congresses did not pass the Clean Air and Water Acts, drug and food safety
laws, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act simply to annoy industry. You took action so
that this country does not regress to a time when our rivers caught fire, our cars exploded on rear
impact, ours workers contracted liver cancer from breathing in benzene, and the industrial zones
of our cities and towns were smothered under a blanket of chemical haze. The legacy of
regulation is not economic ruin, but the possibility that our grandchildren will be better off than
their parents’ generation.
Revitalizing Regulation
A series of catastrophic regulatory failures have focused attention on the troubled
condition of regulatory agencies assigned to protect public health, worker and consumer safety,
and the environment. The destructive convergence of funding shortfalls (many agency budgets
have stagnated or declined while the size of their has grown), political attacks from Congress and
even the White House, and outmoded legal authority (decades-old statutes that only allow for
miniscule penalties for egregious worker safety violations, for instance) have set the stage for
ineffective enforcement and unsupervised industry self-regulation. From the Deepwater Horizon
1

See ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 (Mar.
2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/sect812/feb11/fullreport.pdf.
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spill in the Gulf of Mexico that killed eleven and caused grave environmental and economic
damage, to the worst mining disaster in 40 years at the Big Branch mine in West Virginia with a
death toll of 29, the signs of regulatory dysfunction abound. Peanut paste tainted by salmonella,
glasses imprinted with the Shrek logo contaminated by cadmium and sold at McDonald’s, Code
Red smog days when parents are warned to keep their children indoors, the Vioxx recall—at the
bottom of each well-publicized event is an agency unable to do its job and a company that could
not be relied upon to put the public interest first.
Consider the example of compounding pharmacies left virtually unregulated by state
pharmacy boards and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A compounding pharmacy in
Massachusetts sold drugs contaminated with meningitis to clinics and hospitals nationwide. The
bad medicine has killed 48 and sickened 666, shaking public confidence to its core. In a rare
display of honesty, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg told the Reuters news service: “Over
the years, there has been substantial debate within Congress about the appropriate amount of
FDA oversight and regulation of compounding pharmacies. But unfortunately, there has been a
lack of consensus and many challenges from industry.” And David Kessler, who served as FDA
Commissioner during the Clinton Administration, speculated that the deeply discordant tensions
of the presidential election affected the FDA’s performance: “Everyone is closed down right
now,” he said. “People are being very careful. No one wants to make a mistake.” Compounding
pharmacies make 40 percent of the injectable drugs administered in medical facilities across the
country. Yet other than excoriating Commissioner Hamburg, Congress has done nothing to
improve the oversight of the industry.
As this incident illustrates, the agencies do their best to appear as if they are operating
normally, when any close observer reaches the unavoidable conclusion that they are being
prevented from achieving their statutory mission of protecting the public in an effective and
timely manner. When industrial activities go wrong, the responsible agency’s harshest critics
vilify the regulators first, overlooking or making excuses for the corporate executives whose
negligence caused the disaster. The result is an excruciating Catch-22: regulators are de-funded
and de-fanged, but held to impossible standards when corporate negligence inevitably emerges.
The real question for Congress is how to revive the agencies assigned to protect the American
people, not how to demoralize their staffs, cut their budget, and squelch their rules.
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Executive Summary
It’s likely that few outside of Washington have heard of the Small Business Administration’s
(SBA) Office of Advocacy, but this tiny and largely unaccountable office has quietly become
a highly influential player in the federal regulatory system, wielding extraordinary authority
over the workplace safety standards employers must follow, the quantity of air pollution
factories can emit, and the steps that food manufacturers must take to prevent contamination
of the products that end up on the nation’s dinner tables.
The Office exercises this authority by superintending agency compliance with an expanding
universe of analytical and procedural requirements—imposed by a steady stream of statutes
and executive orders issued during the past three decades—that purportedly seek to ensure
that agencies account for small business interests in their regulatory decision-making.
Controversial rules can quickly become mired in this procedural muck, and an agency’s
failure to carry out every last required analysis with sufficient detail and documentation
can spell doom for even the most important safeguards. This system provides the Office of
Advocacy with a powerful lever for slowing down rules or dictating their substance.
The Office of Advocacy’s role in the regulatory system bears a striking resemblance to that
played by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Both
operate to similar effect, functioning as an anti-regulatory force from within the regulatory
structure, blocking, delaying, and diluting agency efforts to protect public health and safety.
Moreover, both offices have entry into the regulatory process on the strength of seemingly
neutral principles and policy goals—promotion of economic efficiency and protection of
small business, respectively. But in actual practice, both offices serve to politicize the process,
funneling special interest pressure into agency rulemakings, even though such interests
have already had ample opportunity to comment on proposed regulations. Despite these
similarities, however, OIRA receives the bulk of attention from policymakers, the media, and
the public.
This report shines light on the Office of Advocacy’s anti-regulatory work, examining how
its participation in the rulemaking process further degrades an already weakened regulatory
system. As a preliminary matter, the nominal objective of the Office of Advocacy—
subsidizing small businesses through preferential regulatory treatment1—is based on a
needless and destructive tradeoff; the government has several policy options for promoting
small businesses without sacrificing public health and safety. The Office of Advocacy
nevertheless devotes much of its time and resources to blocking, delaying, or diluting
regulatory safeguards or to supporting general anti-regulatory attacks from industry and its
allies in Congress. In short, blocking regulations has become the Office of Advocacy’s de
facto top priority, and its commitment to this goal has led the Office to engage in matters
that have little or nothing to do with advancing small business interests or with ensuring that
federal policy reflects the unique needs of these firms.
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More specifically, the report finds that the Office of Advocacy:
• Pursues an inherently flawed mission that needlessly sacrifices public health
and safety;
• Adds several unnecessary roadblocks to the rulemaking process, preventing agencies
from achieving their respective missions of helping people and the environment
in an effective and timely manner;
• Sponsors anti-regulatory research designed to bolster politicized attacks against
the U.S. regulatory system;
• Testifies at congressional hearings aimed at advancing politicized attacks against
regulations that are inconvenient to well-connected corporate interests;
• Takes advantage of overly broad small business size standards to weaken regulations
for large firms;
• Enables trade association lobbyists to subvert its small business outreach efforts;
• Interferes with agency scientific determinations despite lacking both the legal
authority and relevant expertise to do so; and
• Pushes for rule changes that would benefit large firms instead of narrowly tailoring its
recommendations so that they help only truly small businesses.
The report concludes by identifying several reforms that would enable the Office of Advocacy
to work constructively with regulatory agencies during the rulemaking process to advance
small business interests without undermining those agencies’ mission of protecting public
health and safety. These recommendations are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1: Recommendations for Reforming the Office of Advocacy
A New Mission: Promote
“Win-Win” Regulatory
Solutions that Ensure
Both Small Business
Competitiveness and
Strong Protections
for People and the
Environment

• Congress should amend the Office of Advocacy’s authorizing statutes to focus on
promoting small business “competitiveness” instead of on reducing regulatory impacts
or burdens.
• Congress should provide the SBA with additional legal authorities to establish new
subsidy programs that affirmatively assist small businesses meet effective regulatory
standards without undermining their competitiveness.
• Congress should establish and fully fund a network of small business regulatory
compliance assistance offices.
• Congress should significantly increase agency budgets so that they can effectively
account for small business concerns in rulemakings without hindering their ability to
move forward with needed safeguards.
• The Office of Advocacy should identify and implement regulatory solutions that will
enable small businesses to meet strong public health and safety standards while
remaining competitive with larger firms.  At a minimum, these solutions should
include regulatory compliance assistance, finding opportunities to partner small
businesses in mutually beneficial ways, and securing subsidized loans to cover
compliance costs.
• The Office of Advocacy should develop new guidance that helps agencies better
address small business concerns in rulemakings by working toward win-win regulatory
solutions.
• The President should revoke Executive Order 13272, which empowers the Office of
Advocacy to work with OIRA to interfere in agency rules.

Restored Focus: Helping
Truly Small Businesses
Only

• Congress should revise the Office of Advocacy’s small business size standards
so that they (1) focus on truly small businesses (i.e., those with 20 or fewer employees)
and (2) prevent the Office from working on behalf of all firms, regardless of size,
that work in industrial sectors that pose a high risk to public health and safety.
• Congress should prohibit the Office of Advocacy from working with non-small
businesses and should establish legal mechanisms for ensuring that this prohibition is
observed.
• Congress should conduct more frequent and thorough oversight of the Office of
Advocacy.
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In recent years, corporate interests and their anti-regulatory allies in Congress have
championed several bills that would enhance the Office of Advocacy’s power to prevent
agencies from carrying out their statutory missions of protecting public health and safety.
Two bills—the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act and the Freedom from Restrictive
Excessive Executive Demands and Onerous Mandates Act—would require agencies to
complete several new analytical and procedural requirements purportedly aimed at reducing
regulatory burdens on small businesses. The bills would empower the Office of Advocacy
to monitor agency compliance with these requirements, bolstering its ability to interfere in
individual rulemakings. A third bill, the Clearing Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens Act,
would authorize the Office of Advocacy to second-guess agency civil enforcement actions
against small businesses for certain first-time violations of regulatory reporting requirements.
These bills are part of the broader wave of anti-regulatory attacks that has dominated the
political landscape ever since the Republican Party’s success in the 2010 congressional
elections. When launching these attacks, anti-regulatory advocates frequently invoke smallbusiness concerns. Small business has become a highly romanticized, almost mythological
concept among the public and policymakers alike, evoking images of small “mom and pop”
stores lining the idyllic Main Street of some quaint village. Because no politician wants to
run the risk of being painted as “anti-small business,” anti-regulatory advocates have worked
tirelessly to promote their cause as essential to helping small businesses. Moreover, recent
high profile catastrophes involving inadequately regulated large businesses—including the
BP oil spill and the Wall Street financial collapse—have provided anti-regulatory advocates
with additional impetus to adopt the frame of small business to advance their agenda. In
this atmosphere, proposals to expand the powers of the reliably anti-regulatory Office of
Advocacy have become especially attractive to policymakers intent on weakening the nation’s
already fragile regulatory system.

Distorting the Interests of Small Business

Center for Progressive Reform

Page 5

Background: The Pervasive Problem
of Under-Regulation
The United States faces a problem of under-regulation. The regulatory system is supposed
to protect public health and safety against unacceptable risks, but the destructive
convergence of inadequate resources, political interference, and outmoded legal authority
often prevents regulatory agencies from fulfilling this task in a timely and effective manner.
Unsupervised industry “self-regulation” has filled the resulting vacuum, yielding predictably
catastrophic results.
Evidence of inadequate regulation and enforcement abounds—from the BP oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico to the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster that claimed the lives
of 29 men; from the decaying natural gas pipeline networks running beneath our homes
to the growing risk of imported food tainted with salmonella, botulism, or other
contaminants showing up on grocery store shelves. And, of course, inadequate regulation
of the financial services industry triggered the current economic recession and left millions
unemployed, financially ruined, or both.
The proliferation of analytical and procedural requirements in the rulemaking process
is a significant cause of this dysfunction.2 Regulatory agencies must negotiate these analytical
hurdles, even as their statutory responsibilities expand and their budgets remain constant
or shrink. As agencies grow more “hollowed-out”—stretched thin by the demands of
doing more with less—their pursuit of new safeguards becomes subject to increasing delays,
while many critical tasks are never addressed at all.3 Careful analysis is important, but the
regulatory process has already become so ossified by needless procedures and analyses that
rulemakings commonly require between four and eight years to complete.4 Many of these
analyses and procedures also provide powerful avenues for political interference in individual
rulemakings, as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA) centralized
regulatory review process clearly illustrates.5 A recent CPR study found that OIRA
frequently uses this review process to delay or weaken rules following closed-door meetings
with corporate lobbyists.6
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The Office of Advocacy Pushes the Regulatory
Process Toward Less Effective Regulation

The Office
of Advocacy
has morphed
into an
institutionalized
opponent
of regulation,
slowing
the regulatory
process and
diluting the
protection of
people and the
environment
against
unreasonable
risks.

Since its creation, the Office of Advocacy’s role in the rulemaking process has continually
expanded, providing it with numerous opportunities to intervene in and potentially
undermine individual rulemakings. Congress created the Office to represent small business
in the regulatory system and to advocate for reduced regulation of small business. From
this limited mandate to advocate on behalf of small businesses, the Office has morphed into
an institutionalized opponent of regulation, slowing the regulatory process and diluting
the protection of people and the environment against unreasonable risks. Yet, there is
insufficient public recognition of how the Office participates in the rulemaking process
and why its participation ends up making it more difficult for agencies to reduce safety,
health and environmental risks. In addition, the Office engages in activities that bolster
political attacks on regulation, such as publishing estimates of regulatory costs that are
wildly inaccurate, and that fly in the face of estimates from other agencies of government
with considerably greater expertise in the area. Such activities are frequently undertaken
in conjunction with interest groups and trade associations that represent large business,
not small ones. At times it is difficult to find any difference between the positions taken
by the Office and those taken by such prominent regulatory opponents as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce.
Significantly, when the Office interferes in agency efforts to do the people’s business—that
is, implement and enforce duly enacted legislation—it does so free of virtually any public
accountability mechanisms. The Office is housed within, but institutionally insulated from
the Small Businesses Administration (SBA), a federal agency that supports America’s small
business sector through subsidized loans, preferential government contracting, and other
assistance programs. As such, no chain of command connects the Office to either the head
of the SBA or the President.7 At the same time, Congress has shirked its responsibility to
provide meaningful oversight of the Office’s activities. While Office of Advocacy officials
have testified at dozens of hearings in the last 16 years, only four of those hearings could be
described as oversight hearings for the Office.8 (In reality, two of those four hearings focused
on supposed weaknesses in the Office’s legal authorities and proposals for strengthening those
authorities, rather than critically evaluating its performance.) By comparison, Congress has
held dozens of oversight hearings for the EPA in the last year alone. Because of the lack
of active oversight, Congress has no way to keep track of the Office’s participation in the
regulatory process or to ensure that it is not abusing its authority to intervene in rules to
benefit politically powerful corporate interests at the expensive of public health and safety.
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A Flawed Mission: Needlessly Sacrificing Public Health
and Safety
Preferential regulatory treatment for small business can include regulatory exemptions;
less stringent or delayed regulatory requirements; and relaxed enforcement for regulatory
violations, such as waived or reduced penalties. As with other subsidies that small businesses
receive—such as subsidized loans, tax breaks, and preferential government procurement
and contracting policies9—preferential regulatory treatment makes it easier for people
to start and sustain small businesses. But it also enables these businesses to avoid taking
responsibility for pollution, workplace risks, or any other socially harmful byproducts of their
activities. In other words, preferential regulatory treatment involves an explicit policy choice
to shift the costs of these social harms from small businesses to the general public.
Governments typically subsidize an activity because they want more of the benefits that the
activity produces. Accordingly, policymakers typically justify small business subsidies on the
grounds that these businesses generate greater job growth and innovation as compared to
non-small businesses. As numerous studies have demonstrated, however, small businesses
actually create very few jobs on net, and the evidence is at best mixed as to whether these
firms create more innovation (however that concept is defined and measured).10
Whatever jobs or other economic benefits small businesses do create come at a certain
societal price. As Professor Richard Pierce of The George Washington University Law
School has pointed out, preferential regulatory treatment for small businesses can be
“socially destructive,” because such firms produce greater amounts of many social harms
as compared to their larger counterparts—including dangerous workplaces, instances of
racial discrimination, and air and water pollution.11 For example, one study found that the
risk of a fatal work-related accident is 500 times greater for employees of small businesses
than for employees of large businesses. In addition, small businesses are less likely than
their larger counterparts to reduce their social harms in the absence of enforcement-backed
regulation.12 Since the cost of reducing social harms is often disproportionately greater for
small businesses, they have a stronger economic incentive to avoid pursuing reductions as
much as possible. Further, both reputational concerns and fear of lawsuits are less likely to
motivate small businesses to reduce their social harms. Because many small businesses work
in relatively anonymity, they tend not to suffer significant reputational costs when they are
caught polluting or operating a dangerous workplace. Typically lacking “deep pockets,”
small businesses also tend not to be attractive defendants, even when their socially harmful
activities have clearly injured others.
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Preferential regulatory treatment doesn’t just let small businesses off the hook for the social
harms they create; it can also enable larger businesses to avoid taking responsibility for their
social harms as well.13 When small firms are exempted from regulation, larger businesses
have a strong incentive to try to game the system by outsourcing their more socially harmful
activities to them.

There is a
fundamental
flaw in the
Office of
Advocacy’s
core mission:
Its work
to weaken
regulatory
requirements
for small
businesses
comes at too
high a cost
in terms of
increased
risks to public
health, safety,
and the
environment.

These concerns expose the fundamental flaw in the Office’s core mission: Its work to weaken
regulatory requirements for small businesses comes at too high a cost in terms of increased
risks to public health, safety, and the environment. Preferential regulatory treatment is the
worst kind of subsidy to provide for small businesses, since, as compared to larger firms, they
often produce disproportionately greater amounts of the kind of social harms that regulations
are meant to alleviate. To the extent that the Office succeeds at securing preferential
regulatory treatment for small businesses, it is affirmatively promoting the uniquely
disproportionate amount of social harms they create.

The Office of Advocacy Creates Roadblocks to Effective
Regulation
Passed by Congress in 1976, Pub. L. 94-30514 created the Office of Advocacy and charged
it with representing small businesses before federal agencies. With the passage of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act15 (Reg-Flex) in 1980, Congress made preferential regulatory
treatment of small businesses an explicit goal of the rulemaking process and empowered the
Office to push agencies to pursue this goal. The enactment of the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) in 1996 and the issuance of Executive Order 13272
by George W. Bush in 2002 has further strengthened the Office’s role as an opponent of
effective regulation.
Using its authority under Pub. L. 94-305, Reg-Flex, and Executive Order 13272, the
Office has employed compliance guidance, regulatory comments, and congressional
communications to push agencies to delay, weaken, or abandon crucial rulemakings.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Analytical Requirements

Reg-Flex requires agencies to perform several resource-intensive and time-consuming analyses
of their rules to assess their potential impacts on small businesses. These analyses, layered
as they are on top of the existing morass of regulatory-impact analyses, create an additional
battery of procedural obstacles, further contributing to the ossification problem that already
prevents agencies from developing effective new safeguards in a timely fashion.
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Reg-Flex’s analytical requirements apply only if, prior to proposing the rule, the agency finds
that it would have a “significant economic impact” on a large number of small businesses,
a concept that the Act fails to define. Otherwise, the agency can “certify” that the rule
will not have such an impact, exempting it from the statute’s remaining requirements. For
rules found to have a significant impact, the agency must prepare two different “regulatory
flexibility” analyses, an “initial” analysis for the proposed version of the rule and a “final” one
for the final version.
The two regulatory flexibility analyses provide an inherently distorted picture of the
regulations being assessed—one that is heavily biased against protective safeguards. Agencies
must focus exclusively on the rule’s potential costs on small businesses; the rule’s benefits—
the reason the agency is developing the rule at all—are ignored. In addition, the agency
must evaluate possible alternatives that would “minimize” the rule’s costs for small businesses.
Among the alternatives that agencies must consider are rules that exempt small businesses,
impose weaker standards, or phase in regulatory requirements over a longer timeline. Again,
benefits are ignored: Such analysis automatically disregards any alternatives that would
provide greater protections at equal or only slighter greater cost to small busineses.
Within 10 years of their completion, significant impact rules must go through still a third
analysis—the Reg-Flex periodic look-back requirement. Reg-Flex requires that agencies
review these rules to determine whether they should be eliminated or amended to “minimize”
costs on small business. Again, this one-sided, anti-regulatory analytical framework ignores
regulatory benefits and does not allow agencies to consider expanding rules that have proved
to be successful.

Reg-Flex’s Look-Back Requirement: The Real Record
A recent CPR study reviewed the Reg-Flex look-backs for nearly 40
Environmental Protection Agency and Occupational Safety and Health
Administration regulations and found that nearly every one had concluded
that the regulations were still necessary and did not adversely impact small
businesses.
Source: Sidney Shapiro et al., Saving Lives, Preserving the Environment, Growing the Economy: The
Truth About Regulation 10 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper 1109, 2011), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/RegBenefits_1109.pdf.
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In 1996, Congress amended Reg-Flex to make agency compliance with several
of its provisions—including certification that a rule will not have a significant impact
on small businesses—judicially reviewable. This amendment makes all agency analyses
part of the record for judicial review, and it authorizes reviewing courts to reject a rule
on the sole basis that the agency had failed to adequately comply with one of the Act’s
procedural requirements.
Guidance on Complying with the Regulatory Flexibility Act

Responding to Executive Order 13272’s requirement that the Office of Advocacy “train”
agencies on how to comply with Reg-Flex, the Office has issued a guidance document
in which it spells out in great detail its excessively strict interpretation of Reg-Flex’s
requirements. (The Office most recently updated and expanded the document in May
of 2012.) For example, in the guidance, the Office seeks to strongly discourage agencies
from certifying their rules (i.e., formally concluding that the rules will not have a
significant impact on small businesses, thereby exempting them from Reg-Flex’s procedural
requirements) by demanding that they build a virtually bulletproof record to support
the certification, including providing specific data on how many businesses the rule would
affect and what economic effect the rule would have on those businesses.16 In so doing,
the Office sought to expand the range of rules subject to its influence (i.e., by increasing
the number of rules subject to Reg-Flex procedural requirements that the Office oversees).
Moreover, generating such data about a rule’s potential impacts so early in a rulemaking
is nearly impossible even under the best circumstances. Nevertheless, whenever agencies
are unable to satisfy the Office’s strict certification record requirement, the guide advises
agencies to conduct an initial regulatory flexibility analysis or even conduct a full-blown
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, procedures that add months to the process
and waste scarce agency resources.
Remarkably, in the guidance, the Office also directs agencies to consider in their initial
regulatory flexibility analysis regulatory alternatives that are not even within an agency’s
legal authority to adopt. So, for example, the Office would encourage an agency to develop
a rule that requires small businesses to test a piece of safety equipment only once a year,
even though the underlying statute mandates that such equipment be tested at least twice a
year. The guidance imposes this requirement even though Reg-Flex does not authorize it.
Instead, the Act stipulates that any alternatives that agencies consider to minimize costs for
small businesses must still meet applicable “statutory objectives.”17 In clear contradiction of
Reg-Flex’s plain language, the Office asserts in the guidance “that the IRFA [initial regulatory
flexibility analysis] is designed to explore less burdensome alternatives and not simply those
alternatives it is legally permitted to implement.”18
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Regulatory Comments

Pursuant to its authority under Pub. L. 94-305 to represent small businesses before federal
agencies, the Office of Advocacy frequently comments on agencies’ proposed rules in order to
criticize agencies for not following its excessively strict interpretation of Reg-Flex’s procedural
requirements.19 In its recent comments, the Office typically invokes the strict interpretation
of these provisions that it has outlined in its Reg-Flex compliance guidance document.
Invariably, the faults that the Office of Advocacy asserts are aimed either at increasing
the procedural burdens of Reg-Flex’s requirements—and thus adding more delay
to a rulemaking—or at weakening agency rules outright. The Office might claim that
an agency has improperly certified that its rule will not have a large impact on small business
(and thus is not subject to Reg-Flex’s requirements). Or it might claim that the agency
has not properly carried out required Reg-Flex analyses, perhaps alleging that an agency
hasn’t included enough detail or factual evidence, or that the agency has underestimated
a rule’s costs or has failed to considered adequate weaker alternatives. For example, in its
recent comments on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services’ (FWS) proposed rule that revises
the agency’s critical habitat designation for the Northern Spotted Owl, the Office argued that
the FWS’s evidentiary record in support of certification lacked the necessary specific data and
detail called for in its compliance guidance document.20 With such comments, the Office
seeks to use procedural hurdles of its own creation as a way to hamstring federal regulators
working to fulfill their statutory obligations to regulate within their areas of expertise.
Through Executive Order 13272, the President has given the Office’s comments special
weight, making it difficult for an agency to dismiss the comments, even when they lack
merit. The Order directs agencies to “[g]ive every appropriate consideration” to these
comments. The Order further requires that agencies specifically respond to any of the
Office’s written comments in the preamble to the final rule.
Many reviewing courts take the Office’s comments as powerful evidence that an agency has
failed to comply with Reg-Flex, though these courts are otherwise not obliged to defer
to the Office’s interpretations of Reg-Flex’s provisions.21 For example, a federal district court
rejected a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) rule setting commercial fishing quotas
for Atlantic shark species after finding that the agency had failed to comply with various
Reg-Flex procedures.22 (As noted above, agency compliance with Reg-Flex’s provisions is
judicially reviewable, and courts have the authority to reject rules if they determine that an
agency has failed to adequately comply with one or more of these provisions.) The court’s
analysis in support of this finding relied heavily on the comments that the Office submitted
during the rulemaking process.23
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Reports to Congress and Congressional Testimony

Reg-Flex and Executive Order 13272 direct the Office of Advocacy to monitor and report
to Congress annually on agency compliance with Reg-Flex’s requirements. In these reports,
the Office provides detailed critiques of each agency’s purported failures to implement RegFlex in accordance with the Office’s strict interpretation of the Act’s provisions. For example,
in its most recent report, the Office of Advocacy faulted the initial regulatory flexibility
analysis that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) performed for its proposed rules
requiring dietary information labeling for chain restaurant menus and vending machines,
arguing that the agency’s analysis underestimated both the number of small businesses the
rules would impact and the regulatory costs the rules would impose on those businesses.24
The FDA developed these rules to implement two provisions in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA)—the 2010 health care system reform law. One objective of
the PPACA was to reduce overall health care costs in the United States, and these provisions
were aimed at helping Americans to adopt healthier diets, which in turn would enable them
to avoid potentially expensive medical problems in the future.
For agencies eager to avoid attracting unwanted attention from congressional members
ideologically opposed to their statutory mission, the threat of negative reports from the
Office can have a strong coercive on their activities. Many agencies take self-defeating
preemptive actions, such as preparing overly elaborate or unrequired analyses or drafting
inappropriately weak rules—actions that waste scarce agency resources and dilute
public health and safety protections. The Office’s negative report regarding the FDA’s
implementation of these two controversial provisions in the PPACA undoubtedly has
supplied welcome ammunition to congressional Republicans who continue to wage a fullscale assault on the law.25 The fear of attracting this kind of bad publicity likely pushes the
FDA and others agencies engaged in implementing the health care reform law to be overly
cautious with their Reg-Flex compliance, even when detrimental to the public interest.
In addition to the annual reports, Office of Advocacy officials also testify at congressional
hearings to complain about what they claim are failures by agencies to properly fulfill
Reg-Flex requirements. For example, in April of 2011, the Deputy Chief Counsel for
the Office of Advocacy testified at a House Oversight Committee hearing dedicated to
attacking the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) greenhouse gas regulations. In her
testimony, the Deputy Chief Counsel argued that the EPA had failed to comply with several
requirements, including criticizing the factual basis the agency supplied to justify certifying
its first vehicle efficiency standard as not having a significant impact on small businesses.26
As with the annual reports, the threat of negative publicity from Office of Advocacy
testimony can push agencies to overcompensate in their Reg-Flex compliance efforts.
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Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act Panels

The 1996 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) amended
Reg-Flex to require the EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) to give specially assembled small business panels a chance to oppose proposed
rules before the rest of the public even has a chance to see them. Following the passage of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform bill, congressional Republicans quickly enacted a bill
that subjected the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an agency created by the
Dodd-Frank statute to help implement many of its reform provisions, to the SBREFA panel
requirement as well.
The three agencies must undertake the SBREFA panel process for all planned rules that are
predicted to have a significant impact on small businesses—the same trigger for the various
other Reg-Flex analytical requirements. However, as with the Reg-Flex requirements, an
agency need not undertake the SBREFA panel process if it formally certifies that its planned
rule will not have a significant impact on small businesses. As noted above, an agency’s
decision to certify is subject to judicial review. Given that the Office has set such a high bar
for justifying certification, the threat of judicial review can strongly discourage agencies from
certifying a rule, even when this step would be appropriate.
In some cases, the Office has pressured agencies into undertaking the functional equivalent
of a SBREFA panel, even though their planned rule plainly would not have a significant
impact on small businesses. For instance, OSHA buckled under Office of Advocacy pressure
and conducted a pseudo-SBREFA panel process for its then-planned “300 log MSD column”
rule, which would have added a column to the required injury and illness recording form
so that employers can keep track of their workers’ employment-related musculoskeletal
injuries.27 OSHA went through this process even though the rule’s projected costs would
amount to a mere $4.00 per employer in its first year and $0.67 every year thereafter.28
Much like the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA) centralized review
process, the SBREFA panel process focuses on weakening rules because the panels are
dominated by interests opposed to strong regulatory requirements. Beside the rulemaking
agency representatives, each SBREFA panel must include the Chief Counsel of the Office
of Advocacy (i.e., the individual who heads the Office), OIRA officials, and small business
“representatives.” The Office works with these other outside participants to criticize an
agency’s rule with the goal of weakening it. At the end of the process, the panel prepares a
report compiling all of the criticisms of the draft rule, which is then included in the official
rulemaking record.
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Reg-Flex requires that a rulemaking agency respond to the criticisms included in the
panel’s report, and a failure to do so can provide a reviewing court with a basis to reject
the underlying rule. This process contributes to the ossification of the rulemaking process,
mentioned earlier, and it can create a potent incentive for an agency to weaken the rule rather
than mount a time-consuming defense of a stronger rule, which would require producing an
elaborate analysis to respond to all the criticisms raised in the SBREFA panel report.
SBREFA panel-related delays can add up to a year to the rulemaking process if not
longer. These delays come on top of the several months of delay that the other Reg-Flex
requirements introduce into the rulemaking process. By law, the formal panel period is
supposed to last around two months. But, eager to avoid extensive criticism during the
SBREFA panel process, agencies frequently spend months revising their planned rules
and any underlying economic analyses prior to convening the formal panel. For example,
preparations for the SBREFA panel process appear to have delayed OSHA’s work on the
Injury and Illness Prevention Program (I2P2) rule by more than a year. In June of 2011,
the agency had planned to convene a SBREFA panel for its rule by the end of the month.
Eventually, OSHA pushed this date back to January of 2012 and then March of 2012.29
According to Office of Advocacy records, OSHA still has not convened this panel,30
bringing the total delay to 16 months and counting.
Centralized Regulatory Review at the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs

Executive Order 13272 directs the Office of Advocacy to work closely with OIRA—another
institution that serves to weaken regulation, as previous CPR reports have discussed—
when intervening in agency rules. The Office frequently takes advantage of the Order’s
authorization to meet with OIRA to raise concerns about proposed agency rules. In fact,
a 2012 report from CPR on OIRA meetings with outside advocates found that the Office
participated in 122 of the 1,080 reported meetings (or more than 11 percent) that OIRA
held over the 10-year period covered in the CPR study.31 The Office was by far the most
frequent non-White House participant in OIRA meetings and attended more than three
times the number of meetings attended by the most active industry participant, the American
Chemistry Council (39 meetings).32
This Executive Order builds off of a March 2002 Memorandum of Understanding, which
establishes a formal partnership between the Office and OIRA to strictly enforce Reg-Flex’s
procedural requirements to “achieve a reduction” in regulatory burdens for small businesses.33
The Memorandum directs the Office to seek OIRA’s assistance in pushing agencies to
take corrective action—including more detailed analyses, evaluating additional less costly
alternatives, or even adopting a less costly alternative—when the Office determines that they
have failed to satisfy its strict interpretation of Reg-Flex’s requirements. Given that OIRA
has the power to reject the rules it reviews, agencies are unlikely to ignore its demands for
Reg-Flex-related corrective actions. As such, OIRA provides powerful reinforcement in the
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unlikely event that the Office is unable to extract these corrective actions on its own.
The Memorandum also deputizes OIRA to aid in monitoring agency compliance with
Reg-Flex requirements as part of its normal regulatory review activities. Whenever
OIRA determines that an agency has likely failed to satisfy the Office of Advocacy’s strict
interpretation of any Reg-Flex requirements, it must then work with the Office to push
the offending agency to take corrective action.
Participation in Lawsuits Challenging Rules

Reg-Flex authorizes the Office of Advocacy to join in lawsuits brought by industry to
challenge agency rules, enabling it to push the reviewing court to reject rules for failing
to satisfy applicable Reg-Flex procedural requirements.34 These lawsuits create the highly
unusual scenario in which one office within the Executive Branch is actively engaged
in a legally binding effort to undermine an action taken by another office within the
Executive Branch.
The Office of Advocacy has already participated in several lawsuits in which the reviewing
court returned the rule to the agency to bring the underlying analyses into compliance with
one or more of Reg-Flex’s provisions.35 In response to these adverse rulings, agencies must
undertake new and more detailed analyses, delaying the implementation of their rules and
using up scarce agency resources.

The Office of Advocacy Bolsters Political Attacks on Regulations
In addition to the previous rulemaking-related activities, the Office of Advocacy has taken
actions to buttress the attacks that industry and its allies in Congress have waged against
the U.S. regulatory system as a whole.
Sponsoring Anti-Regulatory Research

Over the years, the Office of Advocacy has doled out taxpayer money to sponsor several
research projects brazenly designed to advance the cause of further weakening the U.S.
regulatory system. Non-governmental researchers carry out these projects under contracts
awarded by the Office with little in the way of oversight or peer review.
The most egregious Office of Advocacy-sponsored research project was the 2010 study
by economists Nicole Crain and Mark Crain, which purported to find that the annual
cost of federal regulations in 2008 was about $1.75 trillion.36 As a CPR white paper first
found,37 and a separate evaluation by the non-partisan Congressional Research Service
later confirmed,38 Crain and Crain were only able to achieve this outlandish cost figure by
employing faulty models, biased assumptions, and erroneous data. The report’s myriad
methodological defects all have a distinctly anti-regulatory bias, each leading inevitably
to overstated cost calculations. Beyond these methodological defects, the Crain and Crain
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report is noteworthy for what it omits: any attempt to account for regulatory benefits.
The report’s exclusive focus on regulatory costs—absurdly high cost estimates, in fact—while
ignoring benefits provides an inherently distorted picture of the regulatory system that is
skewed against all safeguards, no matter how critical they are for protecting public
health and safety

The Crain and
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The Office’s flawed management of the Crain and Crain report contract was equally
disturbing. The contract failed to require the report’s authors to disclose all of the
report’s underlying data, models, assumptions, and calculations, making it impossible
to independently verify the integrity of the report’s findings. In addition, the Office of
Advocacy’s peer review process for the report was woefully inadequate: One reviewer raised
significant concerns with the report’s underlying methodology which were never addressed
while the other’s review consisted of only the following 11-word comment: “I looked it over
and it’s terrific, nothing to add. Congrats[.]”39
Despite the Crain and Crain report’s dubious provenance, regulatory opponents routinely
cite its findings when attacking the U.S. regulatory system or pushing for legislation that
would undermine agencies’ ability to carry out their mission of protecting public health and
safety. The report’s biased frame and risibly overstated findings are tailor-made to support
the false conservative narrative that eliminating regulatory safeguards will translate into
economic growth and job creation. For example, the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, which has held dozens of anti-regulatory hearings since the committee
returned to Republican control, cited the Crain and Crain report and its findings extensively
in a February 2011 study, which attempts to make the specious argument that pending
regulations are stifling job creation.40 Similarly, Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) invoked the Crain
and Crain report when arguing for the Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny
Act, a bill he sponsored that would effectively shut the regulatory system down by blocking
all major regulations unless a majority in both Houses of Congress voted within 90 days to
approve them.41

growth and

Participating in Anti-Regulatory Congressional Hearings

job creation.

Office of Advocacy officials have long served as loyal allies in Congress’s anti-regulatory
hearings, consistently delivering testimony that reinforces the political case for weakening
regulations and further hobbling the regulatory system. As noted, these officials frequently
testify to criticize agency compliance with Reg-Flex procedural requirements, but the same
testimony is also broadly critical of the regulatory system as a whole, echoing the talking
points typically found in the testimony of industry representatives or in the opening
statements of anti-regulatory Members of Congress. For example, the head of the Office of
Advocacy during the George W. Bush Administration testified at a 2005 House Committee
on Government Reform hearing focused on attacking various EPA regulations. His
testimony helped advance the transparently political agenda of the hearing by strongly
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criticizing EPA regulations as unduly burdensome—while conspicuously ignoring their
benefits—and by advocating for rolling them back.42
Office of Advocacy officials have also testified at hearings to support passage of several
pending anti-regulatory bills. In his testimony at a 2006 hearing, for example, the then head
of the Office of Advocacy asserted that the Office “supports the goals of ” a proposed bill
that would amend Reg-Flex’s procedural and analytical requirements to make them more
burdensome for agencies to complete.43

The Office of Advocacy Engages in Anti-Regulatory Activities
Unrelated to Helping Small Businesses
The focal point of the Office of Advocacy’s institutional mission has evolved from seeking
preferential regulatory treatment for small businesses to opposing all regulations. Aided
and abetted by industry groups and their political allies, the Office pursues this mission by
working to block regulations opposed by large corporate interests and attempting to interfere
in the scientific underpinning of agency regulations.
The Office of Advocacy’s Small Business Size Standards Are Overly Broad

For the purposes of implementing Reg-Flex, the Office of Advocacy employs a definition
of “small business” that is a far cry from the common understanding of that term’s meaning.
Instead of being based on a single number (for example, any firm with 20 or fewer
employees), the definition is actually a complex scheme that sets varying size standards
for each industrial sector within the economy.44 Critically, these standards are based on
the relative size of different firms within each given industry, and, as a result, the “small
businesses” in industries that comprise mostly large-sized firms can be huge. In some sectors,
the definition of small business includes firms that employ more than 1,000 workers.
For example, the Office considers a petroleum refinery to be a “small business” as long as it
employs fewer than 1,500 workers. Similarly, chemical plants that employ fewer than 1,000
workers are a “small business” in the Office’s eyes.
Because of these overly broad small business size standards, the Office is able to push
for preferential regulatory treatment for relatively large firms, firms far bigger than the
term “small business” suggests. For example, in August of 2011, the Office submitted
comments on the EPA’s proposed rule to reduce hazardous air pollution for fossil fuel-based
power plants criticizing the agency’s efforts to comply with several Reg-Flex procedural
requirements, including the SBREFA panel process. Among other things, the Office
argued that the EPA had not adequately considered potentially less burdensome regulatory
alternatives for “small business” power plants in its initial regulatory flexibility analysis.45
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Trade Association Lobbyists Subvert the Office of Advocacy’s Small Business
Outreach Efforts

In addition, large corporate interests have supplied representatives for SBREFA panels. For
example, a lobbyist from the American Farm Bureau—a politically powerful trade group that
typically works to advance the interests of industrial-scale farms—recently served as a “small
business” representative on the SBREFA panel for the EPA’s 2010 update to its renewable
fuel standard program.46 By permitting organizations such as the American Farm Bureau
to participate in SBREFA panels, the Office of Advocacy has stretched the concept of small
business representative beyond all recognition. The American Farm Bureau’s membership
includes several industrial-scale agriculture operations that would not meet even the Office’s
generous definition of small business. And, the interests of these industrial-scale operations
often dictate the organization’s political agenda, even when those interests are antithetical
to those of genuinely small farms.47 For example, the catastrophic droughts that affected
much of the United States this past summer provided a glimpse of the harsh impacts that
climate change will have on America’s small farmers. Nevertheless, the American Farm
Bureau worked tirelessly to help defeat the 2009 climate change bill that would have curbed
greenhouse gas emissions through a comprehensive cap-and-trade system.48
In some cases, the small business representatives who participate in SBREFA panels come
at the suggestion of lobbyists for large trade associations, such as the National Association
of Home Builders, whose members include large corporations that do not meet the Office’s
small business size standards.49 This practice raises the concern that lobbyists operating to
advance the interests of large corporations improperly use small businesses representatives as
surrogates to attack rules they oppose, enabling these corporate interests to avoid incurring
any potential political costs for opposing safeguards that are otherwise popular with the
general public.
The participation of large corporate interests defeats the objective of SBREFA panels—
namely, to gather the perspective of small business on pending regulations that would
otherwise not be available in the absence of these panels. These panels offer small businesses
a critical opportunity to offer their unique concerns regarding a planned rule—an
opportunity that is all the more important because large corporate interests have come to
dominate every other step in the rulemaking process, including notice-and-comment and
OIRA’s centralized review.50 By permitting lobbyists for trade associations and other large
corporate groups take part in SBREFA panels, the Office risks allowing the voice of truly
small businesses to be drowned out at this stage of the rulemaking process as well.
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The Office of Advocacy Interferes with Agency Scientific Determinations

The Office of Advocacy frequently operates outside its legal authority and scientific expertise
by weighing in on agencies’ purely scientific determinations. For example, in October
of 2011, the Office submitted regulatory comments criticizing the EPA’s Integrated Risk
Information System (IRIS) program.51 A frequent target of industry attacks, IRIS
is a centralized database that gathers human health risk assessments for various
environmental contaminants, which the EPA can use to set regulatory standards.52
Specifically, the Office criticized the data and models that the EPA had used in its IRIS risk
assessment for the harmful chemical hexavalent chromium, and it urged the agency to revise
its assessment, a process that would waste scarce resources and delay the final assessment by
several months. The Office also recommended that the EPA reform the entire IRIS program,
arguing that it lacked “objectivity” and adequate “scientific rigor.”53 Such recommendations
are far beyond the expertise of the Office and have unique interests of small business.
They do, however, bear a striking resemblance to the arguments that industry lobbyists
make about IRIS assessments.
The Office intervenes in these kinds of scientific determinations despite the fact that they
do not independently impose any regulatory requirements, and thus have no real impact
on small businesses. In June of 2009, the Office intervened in the EPA’s proposed
greenhouse gas endangerment finding, which did nothing more than certify the federal
government’s official finding that greenhouse gases “endanger public health and welfare”
by contributing to global climate change. Nevertheless, the Office argued in its comments
that the EPA should abandon the effort completely.54 The comments added nothing
constructive to the EPA’s endangerment finding efforts, failing to address any of the scientific
questions at issue. Instead, the Office devoted its comments to arguing that the Clean Air
Act’s regulatory programs were not well suited to regulating greenhouse gases and might
disproportionately harm small businesses—all hypothetical and unrelated matters that would
be better addressed in comments on any actual Clean Air Act rules aimed at regulating
greenhouse gases. Again, such arguments were not grounded in any expertise the Office
might have, or in any unique small business interest, but they did comport with big-business
criticisms of the EPA’s finding.
The Office’s decision to move into regulatory science is far removed from its statutory
mission to argue for preferential regulatory treatment for small business. This interest
in attacking regulatory science can only be understood as the Office assuming the role
of arguing against more stringent regulation in all forums that may relate to regulatory
protections, even ones where the agency has no expertise.
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The Office of Advocacy Pushes for Weaker Regulatory Requirements for
Large Businesses

The Office of Advocacy commonly seeks to weaken the requirements of proposed rules
for all affected entities, rather than seeking rule changes that are tailored to reducing adverse
impacts on small firms only. For example, in its comments on the EPA’s proposed rule
to limit hazardous air pollutants from oil- and coal-fueled power plants, the Office criticized
the agency for not considering as a regulatory alternative a rule that would merely limit
plants’ mercury emissions. Remarkably, the Office recommended that this drastically scaledback rule apply to all power plants, regardless of their size.55 Such an alternative would
provide no unique preferential regulatory treatment for “small” power plants. It would also
leave unregulated all of the other toxic air pollutants that power plants release—including
arsenic, lead, and formaldehyde—in clear violation of the Clean Air Act.56 While this
alternative would certainly reduce regulatory costs for small power plants, its primary effect
would be to provide a huge regulatory subsidy to the large power plants that dominate the
electricity generating industry. Here again, the Office offered commentary that could just
have easily been written by big-business or special interest lobbyists, rather than focusing on
an small-business interest in the proposed regulations.
The Office also frequently joins representatives of the largest corporations and trade
groups in meetings with OIRA officials to push for rule changes that would benefit large
businesses. For example, in July of 2010 an Office of Advocacy official attended a meeting
with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and
the National Association of Home Builders to try to push OIRA to block OSHA’s 300 log
MSD column rule.57 In October of 2006 an Office of Advocacy official attended a meeting
with ExxonMobil, the American Chemistry Council, and Bayer Corporation to push for
changes to the EPA’s pending rule to revise its definition of solid waste under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.58
In many cases, weaker regulatory requirements for large firms can actually have the perverse
effect of harming small businesses—rather than helping them—and thus directly conflicts
with the Office’s mission. Regulatory subsidies for large firms can make it even more difficult
for small businesses to remain competitive, inhibiting people’s ability to start these firms and
sustain them over the long run.
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Helping Small Businesses While Promoting
Public Health and Safety: It’s Time to Reform
the Office of Advocacy
A New Mission: Promoting Win-Win Regulatory Solutions
The role of the Office of Advocacy should be to develop “win-win” regulatory solutions that
help small businesses meet the high regulatory standards needed to protect public health
and safety, instead of lowering those standards for them. In other words, the Office should
seek to protect small businesses “competitiveness” without undermining public health and
safety. In many cases, the costs of complying with regulations can put small businesses at
a competitive disadvantage with larger businesses, which are better equipped to pass many
of these costs along to their consumers. Larger businesses are also able to afford attorneys,
engineers, accountants, and other compliance consultants, who can help them devise cheaper
ways to fulfill regulatory requirements.
Providing small businesses with preferential regulatory treatment helps them remain
competitive with larger firms, but it comes at the expense of public health and safety. In
effect, preferential regulatory treatment subsidizes small businesses by passing on to the
public the socially harmful impacts of their activities, such as air and water pollution,
hazardous working conditions, and unreasonably dangerous consumer products. In contrast,
the Office’s current approach of working to reduce regulatory burdens across the board for
all firms reduces regulatory impacts on small businesses, but does nothing to promote small
business competitiveness. This approach also likely undermines regulatory safeguards more
severely than would an approach that merely focuses on providing preferential regulatory
treatment to small businesses alone.
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Fortunately, if the public agrees that small businesses need to be subsidized, policymakers
have an alternative strategy: They can promote small business competitiveness by
affirmatively helping them to meet effective public health and safety standards. The Office
should use its role in the regulatory process to explore and promote creative solutions for
achieving this goal. Such creative solutions could include:
• Providing monetary assistance to truly small businesses so that they can meet
higher regulatory standards. Monetary assistance could include direct subsidies
to cover part or all of the costs of equipment upgrades required for regulatory
compliance. Alternatively, the Office could work to obtain subsidized loans to help
small businesses defray regulatory compliance costs.
• Expanding regulatory compliance assistance programs. SBREFA established
several compliance assistance programs, including requiring agencies to produce
“compliance guides” for each of their rules that have a significant impact on small
businesses.59 These compliance guides describe the rule and explain what actions
small businesses need to take to comply. Congress can help improve the effectiveness
of compliance guides by providing agencies with full funding to produce and
distribute them. In addition, Congress can establish local offices throughout
the country staffed with compliance consultants that can help small businesses
understand their obligations under different regulations. To be effective, Congress
must ensure that the network of compliance consultant offices is fully funded.
• Partnering small businesses to promote beneficial synergies on regulatory
compliance. The Office could explore different ways of partnering small businesses
that will help them meet regulatory obligations in mutually beneficial ways. For
example, the Office could help establish a cooperative of small businesses within a
given location, which could share the cost of compliance assistance services, such
as those provided by accountants or engineering consultants. Alternatively, the
Office could establish partnerships that build off the Small Business Administration’s
(SBA) preferential government procurement and contracting policies for helping
small businesses. For example, if a small business requires special services, such
as accounting, to comply with a regulation, then the Office could explore ways to
partner that business with another small firm that provides those special services. In
this way, the Office can assure that one small business’s compliance with regulations
help to create a profitable market for another small business.
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To achieve these reforms, Congress will need to:
• Amend the primary statutory authorities under which the Office operates (P. Law.
94-305 and Reg-Flex) to replace their focus on reducing small businesses’ regulatory
costs with a new focus on promoting win-win regulatory solutions that ensure small
business competitiveness without undermining public health and safety;
• Expand the Office’s legal authority as necessary to enable it to explore and promote
win-win regulatory alternatives that help small businesses meet high regulatory
standards while maintaining competitiveness;
• Provide the SBA with additional legal authorities to establish and implement new
win-win regulatory subsidy programs that affirmatively assist small businesses remain
competitive while meeting high regulatory standards;
• Establish and fully fund a network of small business regulatory compliance assistance
offices; and
• Increase agency budgets so that they are able to carry out Reg-Flex analyses and
compliance assistance guides without displacing critical resources needed to advance
their statutory mission of protecting public health, safety, and the environment.
In addition, the Office will need to:
• Significantly overhaul its Reg-Flex compliance guide for agencies, so that it helps
them to work toward creative win-win regulatory solutions that enable small
businesses to remain competitive while meeting high regulatory standards and
• Work with small businesses to develop and promote win-win regulatory solutions
in comments on proposed regulations, SBREFA panels, lawsuits, and sponsored
research. SBREFA panels in particular will be critical for gathering the unique views
of small businesses for identifying how pending regulations might inhibit their ability
to compete and for developing innovative solutions for helping these firms to meet
high regulatory standards while remaining competitive.
Finally, the President should revoke Executive Order 13272. Given its strong anti-regulatory
culture, OIRA is unlikely to provide the Office with much assistance in identifying ways to
help small businesses meet regulatory standards needed to protect public health, safety, and
the environment. Instead, OIRA will likely continue to push the Office to weaken agency
rules, even where potential win-win regulatory solutions are appropriate and available.
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Restored Focus: Helping Truly Small Businesses Only
The Office of Advocacy has become a potent anti-regulatory force, working to block, delay,
and dilute all regulations, even those that do not have a clear impact on small businesses.
Whatever the policy goals are that might justify shielding small businesses from fulfilling
their regulatory obligations, they certainly do not extend to larger businesses. Accordingly,
the Office should restrict its actions to helping truly small businesses only.
To accomplish this goal, Congress will need to do the following:
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• Enact legislation that revises the SBA’s small business size standards. The new size
standards should define a small business as any firm with 20 or fewer employees—
regardless of which industry the firm is in—rather than basing the definition on the
relative size of different firms within each given industry, as the current size standards
do. This revision would not only better align the regulatory definition for small
business with the popular understanding of that term, it would better effectuate the
policy goals that the government seeks to achieve by providing truly small businesses
with preferential regulatory treatment. In addition, the small size standards should
exclude certain industrial categories that pose an inherently high risk to public health
and safety, such as the dry cleaning industry. Businesses in these exempted industrial
categories should not qualify for win-win regulatory subsidy programs, even if they
have 20 or fewer employers, because their activities are too harmful to public health
and safety.
• Enact legislation that prohibits large corporate interests from participating in or
using small business surrogates to participate in SBREFA panels. To participate
in SBREFA panels, a business must first qualify as a small business under the revised
small business size standard. To make this mandate enforceable, the law should
further require all businesses that participate in SBREFA panels to certify that they
both meet the revised small business standard and are not acting as agents for any
business or trade group that does not meet the revised small business standard.
Congress should declare that making a false statement in this certification is a crime
under 18 U.S.C. §1001. Furthermore, Congress should bar for at least three years
any business that makes a false statement in the certification from participating in
any future SBREFA panels and from qualifying for any win-win regulatory subsidy
programs established and implemented either by the Office or by the SBA.
• Conduct more frequent and thorough oversight. The House and Senate
committees with primary jurisdiction over the Office—presently, the House
Small Business Committee and the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship
Committee—should endeavor to conduct at least one oversight hearing for the Office
every year. One of the goals of these oversight committee hearings should be to
ensure that the Office is limiting its activities to helping only businesses that meet the
revised small business size standard.
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Again, the President can reinforce these reforms by revoking Executive Order 13272.
Because OIRA has such a strong anti-regulatory culture, any continued collaboration with
OIRA will likely encourage the Office to continue working to block, delay, and dilute
regulations for businesses not meeting the revised small business size standard.
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Small Businesses, Public Health, and Scientific Integrity:
Whose Interests Does the Office of Advocacy
at the Small Business Administration Serve?

Executive Summary
This report examines the activities of an independent office within the Small Business
Administration: the Office of Advocacy. The Office of Advocacy has responsibility for ensuring
that federal agencies evaluate the small business impacts of the rules they adopt. Scientific
assessments are not “rules” and do not regulate small business, yet the Office of Advocacy decided
to comment on technical, scientific assessments of the cancer risks of formaldehyde, styrene, and
chromium. By its own admission, Advocacy lacks the scientific expertise to evaluate the merits of
such assessments.
The report analyzes correspondence and materials received through a Freedom of
Information Act request made by staff at the Center for Effective Government. Our inquiry
was driven by two questions: Why did the Office of Advocacy get involved in the debate over
scientific assessments that do not regulate small business? Whose interests does the Office of
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration actually serve?
We found that the Office of Advocacy’s comments on these assessments raised no issues
of specific concern to small business and relied almost exclusively on talking points provided by
trade associations dominated by big chemical companies. Between 2005 and 2012, the American
Chemistry Council (ACC) and its members spent over $333 million lobbying Congress and
federal agencies on, among other things, a protracted campaign to prevent government agencies
from designating formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium as carcinogens. The Formaldehyde
Council, Styrene Industry Research Council, and Chrome Coalition spent millions more. These
groups asked the Office of Advocacy for assistance, and the Office became their willing partner.
We conclude that the Office of Advocacy’s decision to comment on scientific assessments
of the cancer risks of certain chemicals constitutes a significant and unwarranted expansion of
its role and reach beyond its statutory responsibilities. We recommend that Congress ask the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate the Office of Advocacy and exert more
rigorous oversight of its activities to ensure its work does not undermine the efforts of other
federal agencies to fulfill the goals Congress has assigned them.
Key Findings:
 The Office of Advocacy hosts regular Environmental Roundtables attended by trade
association representatives and lobbyists. The discussions and minutes are kept secret,
although the consensus positions that emerge appear to inform the Office of Advocacy’s
policy positions. These meetings violate the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act.
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 The Office of Advocacy staff made no effort to educate themselves on the science underlying
the debates about the cancer risks of formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium or to verify the
accuracy of the talking points provided to them by industry lobbyists before filing comments
critical of the scientific conclusions in each assessment. Instead, the Office of Advocacy
simply repackaged and submitted talking points provided by trade association lobbyists as
formal comments.
 Correspondence between the Office of Advocacy and trade associations dominated by large
chemical companies and their lobbyists suggests the Office became entangled in a major
lobbying campaign to prevent the federal government from listing certain chemicals as known
or probable carcinogens. E-mails suggest the Office of Advocacy may have violated the AntiLobbying Act and other lobbying restrictions.
 No small businesses objected to the scientific assessments or asked the Office of Advocacy
to intervene in the cancer assessments. The Office of Advocacy made no effort to determine
whether the positions it took represented small business views and interests. Moreover, since
small businesses may produce substitutes for toxic chemicals, a cancer finding for existing
chemicals could open up new markets for substitute chemicals produced by small businesses.
 No process or procedures seem to be in place to ensure that the activities of the Office of
Advocacy are consistent with, and do not work to undermine, the statutory responsibilities of
other agencies.
Recommendations:
 The Office of Advocacy should limit its work to regulatory activities affecting small business,
as authorized by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and subsequent laws.
 Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the Office of Advocacy’s Environmental
Roundtables violate Federal Advisory Committee Act provisions.
 The Office of Advocacy should independently verify the factual claims it makes in comments
to other federal agencies and should not comment on technical or scientific matters on which
its staff have no expertise.
 Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the activities of the Office of Advocacy
represent impermissible lobbying by federal employees.
 The Office of Advocacy should develop procedures to verify that its policies represent the
interests of small business. Its comments should be limited to offering a small business
perspective that the regulating agency would not otherwise hear.
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 Congress should exert more rigorous oversight over the Office of Advocacy to ensure its work
does not delay or prevent other federal agencies from fulfilling their statutory goals, especially
those scientific and regulatory agencies tasked with protecting the health of the American
people.
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Introduction
Americans have long
championed small businesses.
According to the U.S. Census
Bureau, about 5,821,277 businesses
with fewer than 100 employees
are operating in the U.S. today,
employing about 35 percent of the
workforce.1 The federal government
has been actively supporting small
businesses since 1953, when the
Small Business Administration was
established to provide them with
subsidized loans and assistance.
Over the years, survey after survey has shown that a majority of Americans – across the political
spectrum – believes that government should continue to provide assistance and support to small
businesses.2
Surveys also show broad support for federal efforts to protect public health.3 The public
expects the government to keep tainted food and medicines off store shelves. They want cancercausing chemicals regulated, air pollution controlled, and the safety of our water supplies ensured.
In fact, most Americans believe that existing regulations need to be better enforced.4 There is no
reason that these two popular functions of government should conflict.
Yet our investigation, based on correspondence and materials provided through Freedom
of Information Act requests, has unearthed activities by a little-known independent office within
the Small Business Administration – the Office of Advocacy – that is working to undermine
efforts by federal scientists to identify public health hazards and ensure that American families
are protected from cancer-causing substances. These assessments do not regulate the activities of
small business and seem far outside the Office’s mission – to represent the views and interests of
small businesses to other federal agencies.

1 See Statistics about Business Size (including Small Business), U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2013).
2 See, e.g., Small Business Majority, Opinion Poll: Small Business Views on Taxes and the Role of Government
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.smallbusinessmajority.org/small-business-research/taxes/taxes-and-role-of-government.php (finding
that “the majority of small businesses believe government can play an effective role in helping small businesses thrive”).
3 See Coalition for Sensible Safeguards, Summary of Lake Research Partners 2011 Regulatory Research (2011),
http://www.sensiblesafeguards.org/assets/documents/css-lrp-summary.pdf (summarizing the findings of a national poll conducted
May 2011).
4
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Specifically, the Office of Advocacy sought to block the publication of scientific
assessments of the risks of cancer developed by the National Toxicology Program and the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System. When cancer
assessments are delayed or stopped, it means more Americans will be exposed to substances that
can kill. Delay costs lives.
Moreover, a recent survey of a representative sample of small business owners (businesses
with under 100 employees) suggests that the positions taken by the Office of Advocacy do not
represent the views of the constituency on whose behalf it is supposed to advocate.5 About 60
percent of small business owners reported that they believe “exposure to toxic chemicals in dayto-day life” is a very serious or somewhat serious threat today; 75 percent supported “stricter
regulation of chemicals produced and used in everyday products”; 94 percent said “companies
using chemicals of concern to human health should disclose their presence to customers and
the public”; and 92 percent said there should be “a public, easily accessible database identifying
chemicals of high concern to human and environmental health.” The survey mirrored the
demographics of small business owners: three quarters of the respondents were male; 82 percent
were white; half identified as Republican and 23 percent as Independents.6
The activities of the Office of Advocacy described in this report represent an unwarranted
expansion of its jurisdiction, extending its reach well beyond the statutory responsibilities
assigned to the Office under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and subsequent legislation. The Office
of Advocacy operates with little oversight by the Small Business Administration, the White
House, or Congress. Its effort to expand its jurisdiction to weigh in on toxic hazards threatens
important health programs designed to inform the public and federal regulatory agencies about
health risks.

5 The survey of 511 small business owners found that small business owners (SBOs) generally believe toxic chemicals pose a
threat to people’s health, and support stricter regulation and greater disclosure of toxic chemicals. The sample was weighted by
gender, region, ethnicity, industry type, and business size to match the characteristics of small business owners nationally. The
margin of error for the survey is + or – 4.4%. Poll of Small Business Owners on Toxic Chemicals, American Sustainable Business
Council (ASBC) (Sept. 2012), http://asbcouncil.org/node/846.
6
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1. Federal Government Support for Small Businesses and the
Office of Advocacy
Congress established the
Small Business Administration
(SBA) as a separate, executive
branch agency in 1953 to
provide businesses “which are
independently owned and operated
and which are not dominant in their
field of operation” with financial
assistance, such as government-backed loans.7 For the next two decades, this cabinet-level agency
responded to requests for assistance by business.
In 1974, when Congress amended the Small Business Act, it created the office of Chief
Counsel for Advocacy within the Small Business Administration “to represent the views and
interests of small businesses before other Federal agencies whose policies and activities may affect”
small businesses.8 Two years later, in 1976, the Office of Advocacy became an independent office
within SBA, headed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy. The Chief Counsel is appointed by the
president and confirmed by the Senate.9 As head of an independent office, the Chief Counsel
is not required to submit his reports and comments to the SBA Administrator or to the White
House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review or approval.10
Since the Office was established, its statutory authority has grown. In 1980, Congress
passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), which requires every federal agency to assess and
mitigate the impact of proposed and final rules on small business consistent with its statutory
mission and gave the Office of Advocacy the responsibility for overseeing agency compliance with
this new mandate.11

7 Stephen L. Keleti & Joseph A. Maranto, Planning a Full-Scale Audit of the Small Business Administration, 10 GAO Review 51
(1975), available at http://archive.gao.gov/otherpdf1/091092.pdf.
8 Small Business Amendments Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-386, sec. 10, § 5(e)(4), 88 Stat. 742, 749 (1974), amended by Small
Business Act and Small Business Investment Act of 1958, amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-305, tit. 2, § 201, 90 Stat. 663, 668 (1976)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 634c(4) (2006)).
9 Small Business Act and Small Business Investment Act of 1958, amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-305, 90 Stat. 663 (1976) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 634a-f (2006)).
10

15 U.S.C. § 634(f).

11 Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011:
Annual Report of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy on Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and
Executive Order 13272, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY
2011], available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/11regflx_0.pdf.
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Congress again expanded its statutory responsibilities in 1996 when it enacted the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA).12 Among other provisions, this law
required the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to convene small business review panels for every proposed rule that
will have a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”13 The head
of the agency, the head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) (an office
within OMB), and Chief Counsel for Advocacy are required to attend each panel and meet with
representatives of “small entities” to review new rules the agency may propose and the agency’s
analysis of the impact the rule may have on small businesses. The panel then suggests ways the
agency can mitigate the impact on small business. The SBREFA process delays development of
workplace safety and environmental rules considerably.
In 2002, President George W. Bush further expanded the Office of Advocacy’s
responsibilities through Executive Order 13272.14 Under this executive order, all federal agencies
were required to notify the Office of Advocacy earlier in the rulemaking process of rules
that could potentially have a significant effect on small businesses. This was intended to give
agencies more time to adequately consider and respond to comments submitted by the Office of
Advocacy.15 The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 codified these new requirements.
The Office of Advocacy’s budget for FY 2012 was $9.12 million. It has a staff of 46. By
comparison, OIRA, a key office in OMB responsible for reviewing the rules proposed by all
executive agencies, had a staff of 45 in FY 2012.16
As its budget and staff have grown, the Office of Advocacy has moved beyond
commenting on how regulations impact small business to questioning the merits of scientific
assessments of toxic hazards. This substantial expansion of Advocacy’s role is well beyond its
statutory responsibility or substantive expertise.

12 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
13 Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011, supra note 11, at 1–3. The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 also provided that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau must
conduct Small Business Advocacy Review (SBAR) panels when proposing economically significant rules. Id. at 2.
14

Exec. Order No. 13272, 3 C.F.R. 247 (2003), available at http://www.foreffectivegov.org/files/regs/library/eo13272.pdf.

15

Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011, supra note 11, at 2–3.

16 Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Congressional Budget Justification FY 2013, at 6,
available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/3-508%20Compliant%20FY%202013%20Office%20of%20Advocacy%20
CBJ%281%29.pdf.
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2. Protecting the Public from Cancer-causing Chemicals:
Scientific Assessments of Health Risks
A number of laws have been
passed directing federal agencies
to protect the public from health
hazards and to reduce the cancer
risks posed by toxic substances.
For example, the Clean Air Act
requires EPA to reduce particulates
in the air based on science showing
their presence increases the risk
of respiratory diseases. Congress
directed the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) to ban
lead in toys after it was shown that
ingesting lead could cause brain and organ damage in infants. Congress required the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to ban the use of certain preservatives if they are shown to cause
cancer.
However, scientific evidence about the effects of chemicals on human health is cumulative.
It is rare for a single study or two to provide definitive proof of increased cancer risks.
Scientists rely on controlled experiments with animals to predict a chemical’s effect in humans.
Epidemiological studies may indicate, but rarely prove, an association between exposure and
harm for several reasons. Epidemiological studies with adequate statistical power to detect small
increases in common cancers require the collection of data and analysis of effects among large
groups of exposed people. They cannot be completed until enough time has passed for latent
effects to be detected. And, accurate data on past exposures is rarely available; reconstructed data
may not accurately reflect past exposures. Because of this, determining what amount of exposure
to what chemicals causes cancer inevitably requires scientists to make informed judgments.
Rather than asking each federal agency tasked with protecting the public’s health to
conduct its own evaluations of the scientific evidence on carcinogens, several agencies are
tasked with evaluating scientific information and disseminating their conclusions to other
federal agencies and the public. Two of these programs are the National Toxicology Program
in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Integrated Risk Information
System in EPA. Neither program sets emission standards for chemical discharges or enforces
health or safety standards later set by other agencies. Their role is to be an “honest broker”
of scientific studies. However, because labeling a substance a cancer-causing agent can have
adverse consequences in the market and lead to stricter regulation down the road, chemical
manufacturers watch this process carefully, challenge research findings, and develop their own
research to promote alternative hypotheses about cancer causation.
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The National Toxicology Program Report on Carcinogens
The Public Health Service Act of 1978 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to prepare a Report on Carcinogens every other year that identifies substances with the potential
to cause cancer.17 The National Toxicology Program (NTP) prepares the report to be issued on
behalf of the Secretary of HHS, who then communicates this information to the American people
to ensure they can make informed decisions about where they live and work.
The report has two classifications: 54 substances are classified as known to be a human
carcinogen; 186 substances are classified as reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen.18 A
substance is known to be a human carcinogen if there is “sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity
from studies in humans, which indicates a causal relationship between exposure to the agent,
substance, or mixture, and human cancer.”19 A substance is reasonably anticipated to be a human
carcinogen if there is some evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in humans, evidence of
carcinogenicity from animal studies, or other evidence to suggest a substance causes cancer. The
Report on Carcinogens only puts substances into these broad categories; it does not quantitatively
estimate the risk of cancer.
Because manufacturers fear that classifying a substance as a “known carcinogen” can
reduce its use, public officials have developed a thorough and scrupulous process for determining
what substances should be placed on the list. The NTP permits anyone to suggest a chemical
should be put on the list, removed, or reclassified. Once NTP decides to evaluate a nominated
substance, it conducts a comprehensive review of the evidence of its carcinogenicity. This draft
background document is submitted to an expert panel for peer review and is put online to allow
the public to comment. After peer review comments are incorporated into a revised report on
the substance, it is published again, and the public can again comment. The final background
document is then further reviewed by two interagency scientific review groups. Taking all
this feedback into account, NTP prepares a draft “substance profile” and classification listing
recommendation, which is then reviewed by its own Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC). The
BSC solicits comments and holds a public hearing; it then reports on whether the scientific
information in the draft substance profile is technically correct, clearly stated, and supports the
classification recommendation. Only after this process has been completed is the new Report on
Carcinogens published.20

17 Community Mental Health Centers Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-622, Sec. 262(b)(4), 92 Stat. 3412, 3434-35 (1978)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 241(b)(4) (2006)).
18 Nat’l Toxicology Program, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, The Report on Carcinogens: Key Points;
12th Edition (2011), available at http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/materials/report_on_carcinogens_12th_edition_the_508.pdf.
19 Report on Carcinogens: Listing Criteria, Nat’l Toxicology Program, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/?objectid=47B37760-F1F6-975E7C15022B9C93B5A6 (last updated June 15, 2011).
20 In fact, the National Toxicology Program revised the procedures for completing the Report on Carcinogens several times
since 1980 and each time, it has added opportunity for public comment and additional peer review.
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These procedures mean that a great deal of time is required to complete a new edition of
the Report on Carcinogens. Large chemical companies who make the chemicals being evaluated
and the trade associations of which they are members commented repeatedly on the 12th Report,
which was published in 2011. In fact, their comments dominated the debate at NTP over which
chemicals should be listed as carcinogens.
The Environmental Protection Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System Assessments
Another major database of information about chemical toxicity is the Integrated
Risk Information System (IRIS) at EPA, which contains information on the health effects of
environmental contaminants.21 IRIS assessments evaluate the scientific data on chemical hazards
and calculate acceptable exposure levels – the level below which no health effects are expected
(known as the reference dose or reference concentration in air). The IRIS reference dose may be
used by other EPA programs in determining the dose of a chemical to which the public may be
exposed.
The IRIS database contains profiles for over 550 chemicals. Like the NTP Report on
Carcinogens, the assessments are the result of an extensive, multi-step review process. A new
IRIS assessment involves a comprehensive literature review, multiple opportunities for public
comment, rigorous peer review of draft background documents, and final review by independent
experts and other agency staff. The entire process takes at least two years (and often longer). The
final IRIS assessment is posted online along with the summary, toxicological review, and EPA
responses to comments received.
NTP and IRIS provide citizens with important information about the cancer hazards
Americans face. Neither NTP nor IRIS assessments produce rules or regulations that govern
business activity. Yet the Office of Advocacy at the SBA intervened in both the NTP and the
IRIS assessment processes. We investigated how and why interventions related to three specific
chemicals – formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium – occurred.

21 Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS): Basic Information, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/
iris/intro.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2012).

10

The Center for Effective Government’s Investigation
The Center for Effective Government (formerly OMB Watch) filed several Freedom of
Information Act requests with the Office of Advocacy in the spring of 2012. One request asked
for documents relating to Advocacy’s comments on NTP’s 12th Report on Carcinogens and the
risks posed by formaldehyde and styrene. Another FOIA request asked for documents relating to
the Office of Advocacy’s comments on EPA’s IRIS risk assessment for chromium. Advocacy staff
forwarded some documents responsive to our request. After we discovered a number of missing
documents, staff searched their files again and provided more relevant documents. Advocacy
claims the only documents not disclosed were intra- or interagency deliberative documents
withheld under FOIA exemption 5.22 The Office did not provide the Center for Effective
Government with a list of withheld documents.
For each of the three chemical assessments investigated, the debate over the
carcinogenicity of each substance has been going on for decades and involves complex, technical
evaluations of toxicological and epidemiological data. The large manufacturing companies that
produce these chemicals have spent tens of millions of dollars disputing the scientific evidence
showing increased cancer risks. The Office of Advocacy admits it has no scientific expertise in
this area, yet it chose to intervene in these proceedings. In each of the cases we examined, we
asked:
•

Who asked the Office of Advocacy to intervene in these chemical assessments?

•

What efforts did Office of Advocacy staff make to educate themselves on the science
underlying the debates about the health risks of these chemicals?

•

What efforts did the Office of Advocacy make to determine the interests of small
businesses in these issues (i.e., whether small businesses felt this was a priority for them
and/or the impact that a cancer designation for these chemicals would have on small
businesses)?

22 FOIA exemption 5 allows the government to withhold information that concerns communications within or between
agencies that are protected by legal privileges including the attorney-work product privilege and deliberative process privilege. See
Frequently Asked Questions, FOIA.gov, http://www.foia.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
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3. The Office of Advocacy’s Interventions in Scientific Debates
About Public Health and Toxic Chemicals
In each of the cases
discussed below, a growing body of
scientific evidence documented the
cancer risks of the chemical agents.
But as the research evidence grew,
so too did the lobbying efforts of
large producers. It appears that
the Office of Advocacy became
inappropriately and impermissibly
entangled in these lobbying
campaigns. Before moving into
three case studies of these activities,
a word is needed about the Office
of Advocacy’s Roundtables because they seem to play a critical role in shaping the priorities of the
Office.
The Roundtables
Our research suggests that the Office of Advocacy began holding regular roundtables on
different subjects with industry groups around 1990. According to its reports, “Some roundtables
have been scheduled as regularly recurring events, such as Advocacy’s monthly roundtable
on environmental rules and Advocacy’s occupational safety roundtable, which is generally
bimonthly. Other roundtables, such as those concerning transportation and homeland security,
have been held quarterly, while still others have been held on an ad hoc basis.”23
The Office of Advocacy issues the invitations to its roundtables, which are usually held
at the law offices of a firm representing a participating trade association. From correspondence
and reports we have obtained,24 it seems that trade association representatives and lobbyists
sometimes directly ask to give presentations at the roundtables.25 In other cases, Advocacy staff
have worked with trade association staff to plan presentations, asking for input on the agenda, the
presenters, and the title.26
23 Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2008:
Annual Report of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy on Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and
Executive Order 13272, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/08regflx.pdf.
24 The Office of Advocacy provided the environmental roundtable e-mail list, although it is not the most current version and
some e-mails may have changed in the past six months. We were given presentations for the environmental roundtable on July
29, 2011 at which representatives from the American Composite Manufacturers Association and Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturers
Association made presentations. Other miscellaneous roundtable documents were provided as well.
25 E-mail from Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC, to Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy (Mar. 16, 2011) (“I
spoke to Ann earlier this week about presenting the Cr6 research at your upcoming roundtable. Did she indicate she would like to
be part of the program?”).
26
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E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to Charlie Grizzle, lobbyiest for the Formaldehyde Council, and Jim

Most attendees at the roundtables represent trade associations that have large corporate
members, as well as small business members. Advocacy does not require that attendees
represent small businesses. In one e-mail, a staff member at the Office of Advocacy told a
lobbyist for General Electric that he was invited to attend a Labor Safety roundtable as long as he
“maintain[ed] a small business perspective! ;-)”27 Several small business groups perceived to be
liberal or aligned with Democrats were not on the e-mail invitation lists for roundtables held in
2010 and 2011.28
The discussions at the roundtables are closed to the press, and participants are told
they cannot publicly comment on the discussions.29 Any party may report to its membership
what it said, but participants are asked not to report what other participants say or to repeat
what representatives of the Office of Advocacy say. Our investigation suggests that Advocacy’s
positions on policy issues grow out of the discussion at these roundtables.
The documents from the roundtables obtained through our Freedom of Information
Act requests and interviews conducted with participants suggest that presentations on the
three chemical assessments were dominated by the interests of large chemical manufacturers.
The presentations strongly criticized the science showing cancer risks; no competing views
were presented. Nor was there an effort to determine how cancer assessments may impact
small businesses within a certain industry or whether such an assessment might open
markets for substitute chemicals. The assumption seems to be that a cancer assessment that
adversely affects a big chemical company will adversely affect small businesses. From the
materials we were provided and from interviews, we found no evidence that “[s]mall business
representatives” initiated conversation at the roundtables on “the difficulties posed by chemical
risk characterizations at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and at the
Environmental Protection Agency”30 as the Office of Advocacy later claimed.

Skillen, Dir., RISE, cc: Jane C. Luxton, Attorney, Pepper Hamilton, LLP (June 25, 2010) (Subject line: Draft Roundtable Notice_
please review) (“Jane, Charlie – you can decide if I should list both of you or just Charlie. Also, Charlie, I would be interested in
a formaldehyde update also – if you could handle it. I would list that separately. . . . Jim – we can add an additional speaker with
you if you like. Please review the time frames also.”); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to David Fischer, ACC, Ann Mason, ACC,
and John Schweitzer, ACMA (June 28, 2011) (“I’m thinking of two presenters on the NTP process for styrene and formaldehyde
– and to contrast this process with the IRIS risk assessment process, and the merits of the science controversies – for an hour
slot on the 29th. Thoughts?”); E-mail from David Fischer to Kevin L. Bromberg, Ann Mason, and John Schweitzer (July 6, 2011)
(“Kevin, I think discussing NTP process would be very worthwhile but not sure two talks would be necessary since the flaws in
the formaldehyde process were also apparent in styrene’s as well. I’m wondering if we want to discuss the larger issue of rampant
redundancy and inconsistency in hazard/risk assessment within the federal govt. In particular, is the RoC still relevant? Thanks.”);
E-mail from John Schweitzer to Kevin L. Bromberg (July 11, 2011) (“We’ve got a toxicologist standing by for the July 29 SBA
Roundtable. . . .”); E-mail from John Schweitzer to Kevin L. Bromberg (July 22, 2011) (“I will likely present the styrene issue next
week, instead of Jim Bus. Since NTP is not participating, we don’t need to employ our big ‘science guns’.”); E-mail from Kevin L.
Bromberg to David Fischer and John Schweitzer (July 12, 2011) (asking for suggestions for the title of Advocacy’s environmental
roundtable scheduled for July 29th, 2011 and offering three titles for consideration).
27

E-mail from Bruce E. Lundegren, Office of Advocacy, to Pat K. Casano, General Electric (Jan. 10, 2011).

28 After testifying at a joint hearing before the House Science Committee and Small Business Committee on April 25, 2012,
American Sustainable Business Council was invited to attend the Environmental Roundtables.
29 See E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to John Schweitzer, ACMA (Aug. 1, 2011). In editing a press
release for ACMA, Mr. Bromberg wrote “we prefer that we stick to what was presented at the Roundtable – and not a reference
to the discussion at the Roundtable- which we try to keep confidential to aid in having an open discussion (see the bottom of all
Roundtable notices). Participants are free, however, to make known their own comments.”
30

Office of Advocacy Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2011, supra note 11, at 5.
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When a federal agency relies on a group of outside advisors to formulate policy, the
process is supposed to be governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).31 This law is
designed to “limit the influence of special interests” in the public policy decision making process.
The law requires that meetings of advisory groups be open to the public and that advisory
committees be balanced.
The Office of Advocacy’s roundtables may represent improperly constituted advisory
committees. Advocacy invites a group of private citizens to regularly meet and solicits their input
on policy positions. The Office of Advocacy appears to rely on the “consensus views” expressed
during these meetings to formulate the positions it takes. Yet Advocacy conducts the roundtables
behind closed doors and does not disclose records of what is said. Clearly, the roundtables are
incompatible with the goals of FACA.
The Formaldehyde War
Formaldehyde is a colorless, flammable, strong-smelling chemical that is used as
an adhesive, disinfectant, and preservative. It is found in the home in products such as
particleboard, plywood, and glues. Exposure to formaldehyde can cause sensory and skin
irritation and chemical sensitivity. Workers who produce or use formaldehyde are exposed to
greater levels than the general public.32 In 1981, formaldehyde was listed as reasonably anticipated
to be a human carcinogen in the NTP Report on Carcinogens.
The early evidence of the relationship between formaldehyde and cancer actually came
from the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology (CIIT), a research group founded by 11
large chemical companies.33 In 1979, it reported that rats exposed to formaldehyde contracted
cancer. Shortly after this finding, and a strategy memo put out by a Georgia-Pacific health
and safety official,34 the CIIT shifted its focus to conducting research showing that humans
metabolize formaldehyde differently than rats, so that given the same level of exposure, people
absorb less formaldehyde than rats. Risk assessments based on actual cancer incidence among
formaldehyde-exposed workers show risks 50 times higher than those predicted by CIIT’s
models.35 A lobbying effort to block the regulation of formaldehyde as a cancer-causing substance
was funded by the Formaldehyde Institute.

31 FACA rules apply when an assemblage of individuals that includes at least one non-federal employee (a) is working as a
group and (b) is “established or utilized” by agency (c) to provide “advice or recommendations” to the agency. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §
3(2) (2006).
32 See generally Formaldehyde and Cancer Risk, Nat’l Cancer Institute, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/
formaldehyde (last reviewed June 10, 2011); Formaldehyde, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
topics/formaldehyde/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2012).
33 Dan Fagin et al., Toxic Deception: How the Chemical Industry Manipulates Science, Bends the Law, and
Endangers Your Health 47 (1996).
34 Georgia-Pacific, a subsidiary of Koch Industries, is one of the country’s top producers of formaldehyde. Other large chemical
companies who have been active in the fight include Cleanese, Dupont, and other members of the now-defunct Formaldehyde
Institute. See Formaldehyde Added to “Known Carcinogens” List Despite Lobbying by Koch Brothers, Chemical Industry, Democracy
Now (June 14, 2011), available at http://ec.libsyn.com/p/8/5/6/8565271316161e75/dn2011-0614-1.mp3?d13a76d516d9dec20c3d27
6ce028ed5089ab1ce3dae902ea1d01cd8032d8ce5c4d5e&c_id=3325818; Laurie Bennett, The Mighty Formaldehyde Lobby, Muckety
(Oct. 7, 2012, 7:09 AM), http://news.muckety.com/2012/10/07/the-mighty-formaldehyde-lobby/38441.
35
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Fagin et al., supra note 33, at 76.

Based on the NTP assessment in 1981, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) sought to regulate workplace exposure to formaldehyde. Industry
opposition was so intense that a new exposure limit was only published in response to a court
order.36 OSHA’s final standard, not issued until 1987, fully considered, and rejected, the industry
theory; instead, OSHA concluded that formaldehyde posed a significant cancer risk to exposed
workers.37
EPA also set out to evaluate formaldehyde’s risks. In the 1980s, its risk assessment
accepted the industry theory that formaldehyde posed little cancer risk to humans,38 even though
EPA’s own Science Advisory Board warned the agency against this approach in 1992.39
Over the past two decades, a growing body of human epidemiology studies has
consistently shown upper airway and blood cancers among workers exposed to formaldehyde.
In fact, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) designated formaldehyde a
“probable human carcinogen” as early as 1987 and in 2006 concluded that there is “sufficient
evidence in humans” that formaldehyde causes cancer of the nasal passages and “strong but not
sufficient” evidence for a causal association between leukemia and formaldehyde.40
By 2008, a paper by EPA concluded that the industry risk model showing minimal human
risk was “unsupportable.”41 As a result, EPA revised its formaldehyde risk assessment in 2009,
concluding, as had IARC, that formaldehyde is known to cause cancer of the nasal passages and
leukemia.

36

UAW v. Donovan, 756 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

37 UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Although both OSHA and the courts rejected the formaldehyde
industry’s self-serving interpretation of the chemical’s cancer risk, economists at OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) accepted it. OIRA repeatedly cited OSHA’s formaldehyde standard as a rule with large costs but few benefits.
OIRA’s analysis of the costs and benefits of formaldehyde regulation has been thoroughly discredited. See Lisa Heinzerling,
Regulatory Costs of Mythical Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998).
38

See Fagin et al., supra note 33, at 89–91.

39

Id. at 73.

40 Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Formaldehyde, 2-Butoxyethanol and 1-tert-Butoxypropan-2-ol, 88 IARC
Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans (2006), available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/
Monographs/vol88/mono88.pdf.
41 Franklin Mirer, Risky Business: Forming Your Opinion Regarding Cancer and Formaldehyde, The Synergist, Apr. 2009, at 32
(quoting Kenny S. Crump et al., Sensitivity Analysis of Biologically Motivated Model for Formaldehyde-Induced Respiratory Cancer
in Humans, 52:6 Annals of Occupational Hygiene 481 (2008)).
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Producers immediately began a campaign to block the new IRIS risk assessment. Initially,
the Formaldehyde Institute led the fight against designating formaldehyde as a carcinogen, but
it disbanded in 1993 after documents showing the industry’s research strategy of obfuscating
formaldehyde’s risks were produced during discovery in a lawsuit seeking damages for illnesses
caused by formaldehyde exposure. The Formaldehyde Council assumed its role as the dominant
industry trade association in 1995. It was dominated by big chemical companies that were
manufacturing formaldehyde.42 In 2010, it ceased operations at the same time that the American
Chemistry Council (ACC) formed a Formaldehyde Panel funded by Georgia-Pacific (owned by
Koch Industries) and Hexion Specialty Chemicals.43 Beginning in 2010, efforts to block the IRIS
and NTP assessments of formaldehyde, at federal agencies and in Congress, were led by lobbyists
for the ACC.
Sen. David Vitter (R-LA) put a hold on an EPA nominee until the agency asked the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the IRIS formaldehyde risk assessment shortly
after a lobbyist for the Formaldehyde Council held a fundraiser on the senator’s behalf.44 Koch
Industries and a Formaldehyde Council lobbyist also gave generous campaign contributions to
other senators leading the effort to delay the assessment.45 Responding to this political pressure,
EPA requested the review, which NAS published in April 2011.46 The NAS review affirmed EPA’s
conclusion that formaldehyde was a known human carcinogen, causing upper airway cancers, but
directed EPA to restate its reasons for concluding that formaldehyde caused leukemia in humans.
EPA has not released revisions to its formaldehyde IRIS assessment since the NAS review was
completed.

42 The by-laws of the Formaldehyde Council require that members of the Board of Directors represent Tier 1 members of
the Council. Companies must pay $200,000 to become Tier 1 members, so it is unlikely that many small businesses sat on the
Formaldehyde Council’s governing body.
43

See ACC Forms New Formaldehyde Panel, American Chemistry Council, http://www.americanchemistry.com/11312.

44 Joaquin Sapien, How Senator Vitter Battled the EPA over Formaldehyde’s Link to Cancer, ProPublica (Apr. 15, 2010, 2:30 AM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/how-senator-david-vitter-battled-formaldehyde-link-to-cancer.
45 Id. (linking Koch Industries and Charles Grizzle, a lobbyist for the Formaldehyde Council, to campaign contributions to
Sens. Inhofe and Vitter).
46 Committee to Review EPA’s Draft IRIS Assessment of Formaldehyde, Nat’l Research Council, Review of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Draft IRIS Assessment of Formaldehyde (2011), available at http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=13142. Industry interprets the NAS report as critical of EPA’s risk assessment; environmental groups
such as Natural Resources Defense Council interpret the report as questioning EPA’s discussion of how formaldehyde causes blood
cancers, without disagreeing with its conclusion that formaldehyde is carcinogenic.
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At HHS, NTP responded to the IARC listing and
new research by proposing to move formaldehyde from
“NTP Excerpt – What is the
detailed industry argument
an “anticipated” human carcinogen to a “known human
that this is incorrect?”
carcinogen,” causing upper airway cancers and leukemia,
th
as they prepared the 12 Report on Carcinogens. The
-e-mail subject line from Kevin L.
Formaldehyde Council and the ACC strongly objected,
Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to
filing multiple comments with NTP. Industry demanded
Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist
for ACC
that NTP incorporate the NAS analysis of the IRIS risk
assessment into its evaluation, which it did. But the ACC
and Dow Chemical continued to lobby Congress to delay
publication of the Report on Carcinogens until another NAS review was conducted.47 Republican
House representatives unsuccessfully pushed an appropriations rider to delay the Report’s
release.48
Advocacy Involvement
The Office of Advocacy waded into the debate in November 2011 with formal comments
claiming that “[s]mall businesses have taken issue with . . . formaldehyde’s listing as ‘known to be
a human carcinogen’” and that they were “concerned with the quality of scientific analysis” relied
upon by NTP.49
Our review of the materials gathered from
our Freedom of Information Act request shows no
documents from any small businesses asking the Office
of Advocacy to intervene in the formaldehyde listing,
nor did any small business file comments with NTP
criticizing its analysis.50 Instead, internal Advocacy
documents show that Advocacy communicated regularly
with registered lobbyists for the Formaldehyde Council
and ACC.51

“I guess he’s essentially
wrong. It’s probably better
for now that I keep the NTP
contact in the dark.”
-e-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, to
David Fischer, ACC

47 See Jennifer Sass, Health Scientists Sign on to Tell Congress Not to Strip Funding for the Report on Carcinogens, Switchboard:
Natural Resources Defense Council Staff Blog (Sept. 5, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jsass/health_scientists_sign_on_
to_t.html.
48 Committee on Appropriations, 112th Congress, Working Bill on Appropriations for Departments of Labor,
Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies FY 2013, (Comm. Print 2012), available at http://
appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-112hr-sc-ap-fy13-laborhhsed.pdf.
49 Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of
Advocacy, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Nov. 22, 2011), http://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Advocacy_Comment_Letter-Report_On_Carcinogens.pdf.
50 The only comments NTP received were from trade associations, large chemical companies, consulting firms, and
academic and research institutions. See Formaldehyde [CAS No. 50-00-0], Public Comments: Substances Newly Reviewed
for the 12th RoC, Nat’l Toxicology Program, http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid=20A477F2-F1F6-975E7472FC6B0DA56D9C#formaldehyde (last updated July 19, 2012).
51 See E-mails between Kevin Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, and Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC (May 2011);
E-mails between Kevin Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, and Charles Grizzle, registered lobbyist for the Formaldehyde Council
(June-Aug. 2010).
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Moreover, documents show that the Office of Advocacy made no effort to evaluate the
scientific evidence behind the NTP assessment. Instead, Advocacy asked lobbyists for ACC to
provide a “detailed industry” rebuttal to NTP.52 In May 2011, Advocacy staff followed up with
ACC and its lobbyists about their meetings with agency officials regarding formaldehyde.53
Advocacy also collaborated on press strategy with ACC54 and discussed whether and when to
share materials with agency staff.55
Styrene Skirmishes
Styrene is a clear, liquid, volatile organic compound used predominantly in the
manufacture of plastics and rubber.56 Synthetic styrene derived from oil and natural gas is
most commonly found in carpet backing, fiberglass composites (e.g., bathtubs and kitchen
countertops), and even in polystyrene food containers. Styrene may be released into the
environment during manufacture, use, or disposal, contaminating air and drinking water.
As far back as 1988, studies showed styrene caused cancer in laboratory mice.57 Human
studies in the years since have suggested that occupational exposure to styrene can lead to
increased risk of lymphomas, leukemia, and pancreatic or esophageal cancers.58 The IARC has
listed styrene as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” since 2002.59 Growing evidence from animal
studies and limited evidence of cancer risks among workers caused NTP to propose listing
styrene as “reasonably anticipated” to cause cancer in its 12th Report on Carcinogens.

52 E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC, and cc: David
Fischer, ACC (May 25, 2011). The e-mail contained the subject line, “NTP Excerpt – What is the detailed industry argument that
this is incorrect?”
53 E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for ACC (May 24, 2011)
(“News from the meeting?”); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to David Fischer, ACC (May 24, 3011) (“Was
there an ACC meeting today with HHS? Any news?”).
54 E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy, to David Fischer, ACC, and Randy Schumacher, registered lobbyist for
ACC (May 25, 2011) (Kevin Bromberg: “Will the news about an RoC delay get into the press? Do you want it there?”).
55 E-mail from David Fischer, ACC, to Kevin L. Bromberg, Office of Advocacy (May 25, 2011) (David Fischer: “Who at NTP
were you thinking of sharing it with? John Bucher of NTP essentially told House committee staff that the NRC’s report was not
relevant to the NTP RoC.”); E-mail reply from Kevin L. Bromberg to David Fischer (May 25, 2011) (Kevin Bromberg: “I guess he’s
essentially wrong. It’s probably better for now that I keep the NTP contact in the dark.”).
56 Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Toxicological Profile
for Styrene 1–8 (2010), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp53.pdf; Nat’l Toxicology Program, U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Services, Styrene: Key Points (June 2011), available at http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/materials/
styrene_508.pdf; Frequently Asked Questions, Styrene Info. & Res. Center, http://www.styrene.org/faq.html#one (last visited Jan. 7,
2013).
57 Barbara Conti et al., Long-Term Carcinogenicity Bioassays on Styrene Administered by Inhalation, Ingestion and Injection and
Styrene Oxide Administered by Ingestion in Sprague-Dawley Rats, and Para-Methylstyrene Administered by Ingestion in SpragueDawley Rats and Swiss Mice, 534 Annals of the N.Y. Acad. of Sci. 203–34 (1988).
58

Nat’l Toxicology Program, supra note 50.

59 Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Some Traditional Herbal Medicines, Some Mycotoxins, Napthalene, and
Styrene, 82 IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans 437–522 (2002), available at http://
monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol82/mono82.pdf.
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Not surprisingly, companies producing styrene vigorously disputed its danger to humans.
Like formaldehyde producers, they argued that humans metabolize the toxin differently than
animals, so higher exposures are less toxic to people than to laboratory mice. The Styrene
Information and Research Council (SIRC) spent over $20 million on 47 studies examining the
health and environmental effects of styrene exposure; none found clear cancer risks.60 Yet other
evidence tells a different story.61
In fact, OSHA has regulated styrene’s “narcotic” health effects on workers since 1971.62 By
1989, with evidence of cancer risks increasing, OSHA proposed to revisit its limits on permissible
exposure to styrene.63 But industry associations strongly objected to OSHA characterizing styrene
as carcinogenic, arguing there was insufficient data to support such a classification.64 OSHA
backed down; its final rule reducing styrene exposure, later overturned in court, relied only on
“its narcotic effects” as justification.65
In 1998, SIRC convinced EPA to allow SIRC to conduct the IRIS hazard assessment of
styrene.66 The industry assessment was of such poor quality that it was unusable. However, the
tactic delayed EPA’s IRIS assessment update of the cancer risks of styrene for some time.67

60 Summary of SIRC-Supported Research, Styrene Info. & Res. Center, http://www.styrene.org/science/research_summary.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
61

See supra notes 57–59.

62

Air Contaminants, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 tbl. Z-1 (1999).

63 The update was referred to by OSHA as the PEL project and OSHA sought to substitute outdated consensus standards, first
adopted by the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) in the 1960s, with consensus standards
current in the late 1980s. Final Rule, Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332–2983 (Jan. 19, 1989), revoked 58 Fed. Reg. 35338–
35351 (June 30, 1993).
64 Letter from John B. Jenks, Chairman, Styrene Info. & Research Ctr. et al., to Joseph A. Dear, Assistant Sec’y of Occupational
Safety & Health, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Jan. 30, 1996), available at http://www.acmanet.org/ga/osha_styrene_agreement_docs_1996.
pdf.
65 OSHA’s PEL update was invalidated by the 11th Circuit. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992); see also
Revocation of Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 35338–35351 (June 30, 1993).
66 See Jennifer Sass & Daniel Rosenberg, Natural Resources Defense Council, The Delay Game: How the
Chemical Industry Ducks Regulation of the Most Toxic Substances 15 (2011), available at http://www.nrdc.org/health/
files/IrisDelayReport.pdf.
67

Id. at 16.
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Since styrene was nominated for inclusion in the 12th Report on Carcinogens in 2004,
SIRC filed 22 comments arguing against listing the substance.68 As the Report neared publication,
the industry group doubled its lobbying expenditures, increasing its funding from $200,000 in
2010 to over $400,000 in 2011.69 Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA), Rep. John Shadegg (R-AZ), and 34
other members of Congress sent a letter to HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius criticizing the NTP
assessment of styrene’s risks,70 and the American Composite Manufacturers Association (ACMA)
campaigned “aggressively to overturn the NTP listing.”71 When the Report on Carcinogens was
finally released on June 10, 2011, it listed styrene as “reasonably anticipated” to cause cancer. The
same day, SIRC and Dart Corporation filed suit challenging this assessment of styrene’s risks.72
Dow Chemical is a founding member of SIRC. Two of the association’s websites are
registered to the Management Informations Systems Director at the American Chemistry
Council. SIRC’s offices, coincidentally, were in the same location in Arlington, VA, as those of the
Formaldehyde Council. And one of its lobbying firms also lobbied for ACC, while another of its
firms lobbied for Dow Chemical.
Advocacy Involvement
The Office of Advocacy was asked by lobbyists from SIRC and ACMA to comment on
the NTP assessment of styrene and did so. A consultant from a lobbying firm hired by SIRC first
contacted the Office of Advocacy on June 4, 2010, regarding the styrene listing under review for
the 12th Report on Carcinogens.73 Following that contact, the same consultant helped ACMA
representatives plan a meeting with Advocacy on Sept. 15, 2010, to discuss ACMA’s concerns
about the styrene assessment.74

68 Intervenor-Defendants’ Reply in Support of Defendants’ & Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at 6, Styrene Info. &
Research Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 11-1079 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2012).
69 SIRC’s lobbying expenditures had been minimal before 2010. Lobbying: Styrene Information and Research Center (2011),
Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000057259&year=2011 (last visited Jan. 7,
2012); Lobbying: Styrene Information and Research Center (2010), Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientsum.php?id=D000057259&year=2010 (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
70 Letter from Rep. Rick Boucher and Rep. John Shadegg et al., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Apr. 21, 2010) (requesting that the listing of styrene be deferred for review until the 13th
Report on Carcinogens).
71 ACMA Continues Fight on NTP Styrene Listing, Am. Composites Manufacturers Ass’n (ACMA), http://www.acmanet.org/
ga/styrene.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). ACMA had lobbying expenses relating to NTP of at least $56,000 in 2010 and $70,000 in
2011. Lobbying: American Composites Manufacturers Assn (2011), Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientsum.php?id=D000023940&year=2011 (last visited Jan. 7, 2013); Lobbying: American Composites Manufacturers Assn (2010),
Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000023940&year=2010 (last visited Jan. 7,
2013).
72 Complaint, Styrene Info. & Research Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 11-1079 (D.D.C. June 10, 2011), available at http://www.
styrene.org/news/pdfs/06-10-11-SIRCvSebeliusComplaint.pdf.
73 E-mail from Burleson Smith to Kevin L. Bromberg (June 4, 2010) (attaching letters sent by the Styrene Information and
Research Council and members of Congress to the Secretary of Health and Human Services requesting that the styrene listing be
deferred and re-reviewed in the 13th Report on Carcinogens).
74 E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 14, 2010) (sending over the list of attendees for the meeting);
E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 15, 2010) (attaching the ACMA Issue Summary in advance of the
meeting outlining ACMA’s “previous efforts to ask NTP to review all of the data . . . .”).
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At the meeting, directors of ACMA or its lobbyists asked Advocacy to schedule an
interagency meeting with the Office of Management and Budget and NTP to discuss the
assessment and to submit a request to Sebelius asking her to drop the styrene listing.75 After a
second meeting on Nov. 30, 2010, ACMA directors submitted letters to the Office of Advocacy
asking the Office to get involved with the styrene listing.76 Staff at Advocacy quickly did as they
were asked and forwarded ACMA’s letter to HHS on the same day.77 In its letter, ACMA claimed
the NTP listing would jeopardize 500,000 jobs. That figure represents more than 75 percent of all
jobs SIRC identifies as styrene-related.
When these efforts failed to block the listing, industry lobbyists asked for help in securing
changes to the assessment procedures so that they could have more opportunities to influence the
process, even though the industry trade associations and research groups had already commented
extensively on NTP’s proposed listing. The ACC launched a lobbying campaign to get Congress
to change the procedures; SIRC actively lobbied in support of this effort.78
No individual small business contacted Advocacy about the styrene listing. The Office of
Advocacy received correspondence about the styrene assessment only from SIRC and ACMA.
Small businesses did not file comments on styrene with NTP independent of ACMA.79

75 E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 15, 2010). The e-mail includes an attachment describing ACMA’s
actions related to the styrene listing and asks the Small Business Administration to: “Elevate this issue as a priority within the
Office of Advocacy and assign a member of your staff to champion this effort; Contact the Office of Management and Budget
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OMB-OIRA) and request an interagency meeting with NTP to evaluate these
claims; Submit a request to the Secretary of Health and Human Services Sebelius to postpone making her determination regarding
styrene until the 13th RoC in order to implement the improvements to the process and to review all of the data for styrene before
making a determination regarding the potential for carcinogenicity in keeping with other review processes.” Cf. Letter from
Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Dec. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/hhs10_1201.pdf.
76 E-mail from Burleson Smith to David J. Rostker (Nov. 30, 2010) (sending a follow-up email from the meeting earlier that day
with an attachment to an Information Quality Act Request for Corrections that SIRC submitted to HHS in October 2009); E-mail
from Angie Castillo to David J. Rostker (Dec. 1, 2010) (attaching separate letters from Tom Dobbins and Monty Felix to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy).
77 E-mail from Angie Castillo to David J. Rostker (Dec. 1, 2010) (attaching separate letters from Tom Dobbins and Monty Felix
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy). Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, to Kathleen
Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.sba.
gov/sites/default/files/hhs10_1201.pdf. Advocacy’s comment letter “encourage[s] NTP to consider all relevant scientific data in
making its recommendations, including studies that show negative or null results” and to “carefully consider these concerns as the
12th Report on Carcinogens is finalized and the preparations for the 13th report are begun.” Id. ACMA quickly thanked Advocacy
for its help. E-mail from Tom Dobbins to David J. Rostker (Dec. 2, 2010) (“Thanks to you, Dr. Sargeant and the rest of the team
for the quick turnaround on this important letter.”).
78 Kate Sheppard, Republicans Attempt to Ax Program Monitoring Carcinogens, Mother Jones (Aug. 24, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2012/08/republicans-attempt-ax-program-monitoring-carcinogens; Sarah Vogel, Hands
off the Report on Carcinogens, Environmental Defense Fund (Sept. 5, 2012), http://blogs.edf.org/nanotechnology/2012/09/05/
hands-off-the-report-on-carcinogens/; Nicholas D. Kristof, The Cancer Lobby, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/10/07/opinion/sunday/kristof-the-cancer-lobby.html?_r=0; see also sources cited supra note 69.
79 Scientific Reviews for Listings in the 12th Report on Carcinogens: Public Comments, Nat’l Toxicology Program, http://ntp.niehs.
nih.gov/index.cfm?objectid=20A477F2-F1F6-975E-7472FC6B0DA56D9C#styrene (last updated July 19, 2012).
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Advocacy filed a second set of comments after the Report on Carcinogens was published
and SIRC had filed its lawsuit challenging the styrene classification. In its comments in
November 2011, Advocacy criticized the NTP listing of styrene again, in the same letter it sent
criticizing the formaldehyde listing, expressing concern about “the quality of [the Report on
Carcinogens’] scientific analysis, the robustness of the scientific process, including procedures for
peer review and public comment procedures, and that [the Report on Carcinogens] is duplicative
of other federal chemical risk assessment programs, particularly the IRIS.”80 These comments
repeated the talking points provided by ACMA and SIRC.81
The Office of Advocacy became involved in the styrene issue in response to a request by
the affected trade associations, which are dominated by big businesses or their lobbyists, and its
comments repeated their arguments. At a hearing on the Report on Carcinogens, held by the
House Science Committee and Small Business Committee in April 2012, Advocacy staff admitted
they made no effort to verify industry’s claims.82 After hearing the testimony, Rep. Brad Miller
(D-NC) commented that the Office of Advocacy “relied for their scientific judgment and process
comments on the information provided by Styrene lobbyists, so their testimony was really just an
echo of what we heard from the Dow Chemical industry scientist.”83

80 Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of
Advocacy, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Services, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Nov. 22, 2011), http://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Advocacy_Comment_Letter-Report_On_Carcinogens.pdf; Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief
Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of Advocacy, to Dr. Ruth Lunn, Director, Office
of the Report on Carcinogens 4 (Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/NTP/RoC/Thirteenth/Process/PublicComm/
SBA20111214.pdf.
81 E-mail from Burleson Smith to Charles A. Maresca (Sept. 15, 2010). This e-mail includes an attachment of an ACMA Issue
Summary to be discussed at the meeting with Advocacy on Sept. 15, 2010. The document identifies four major areas of concern:
[1] The styrene listing will raise unnecessary concerns about the safety of styrene among employees and communities exposed
to the chemical; [2] NTP’s position on styrene is inconsistent with a European report and a Blue Ribbon Panel report on styrene
because NTP failed to adequately consider negative studies; [3] NTP’s review process causes concerns about the scientific quality
and validity of its findings on styrene; and [4] Businesses that have participated in the NTP process have not been assured that
their comments were considered during the review process. These talking points were reiterated in a presentation by ACMA
at Advocacy’s environmental roundtable on July 29th, 2011. Advocacy’s letter on November 22, 2011 regarding styrene and
formaldehyde mirror the talking points made in these two documents.
82 Webcast, How the Report on Carcinogens Uses Science to Meet its Statutory Obligations, and its Impact on Small Business
Jobs, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology and the
Subcomm. on Healthcare and Technology of the H. Comm. on Small Business, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Hearing on Report on
Carcinogens] (statement of Charles A. Maresca, Dir., Interagency Affairs, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin.), available at
http://science.edgeboss.net/wmedia/science/sst2012/042512.wvx.
83 Press Release, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology Minority, Subcommittee Misses Opportunity to Understand
the Impact of National Toxicology Program’s Report on Carcinogens (Apr. 25, 2012), http://democrats.science.house.gov/pressrelease/subcommittee-misses-opportunity-understand-impact-national-toxicology-program%E2%80%99s-report.
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Chromium Battles
Chromium is a naturally occurring heavy metal, found in two widely used classes of
compounds: trivalent chromium (chromium‑3) and the more carcinogenic hexavalent chromium
(chromium‑6).84 Hexavalent chromium is used for chrome plating, dyes and pigments, treating
wood, and for producing steel and other alloys.85 Hexavalent chromium exposure can come from
inhaling or ingesting the substance. Inhalation of hexavalent chromium has long been recognized
as a cancer risk to workers in the chromium industry. In fact, hexavalent chromium has been
listed as a “known human carcinogen” in NTP’s Report on Carcinogens since 1980,86 and the EPA
IRIS database has calculated maximum limits for chromium inhalation since 1998.87
OSHA began regulating worker exposure to chromium in 1971, after it adopted a
consensus standard as a mandatory workplace limit.88 The National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health recommended OSHA improve its chromium-6 standard in 1975 to better
protect workers,89 but no new OSHA standard was forthcoming. In 1993, Public Citizen and the
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers sued OSHA to compel it to set new exposure standards to
reduce workers’ chromium cancer risk.90
The Chrome Coalition, a trade association of chromium manufacturers, immediately
hired consultants to publicize the findings from 18 studies on the health effects of hexavalent
chromium it had commissioned; all found minimal cancer risks.91 Industry groups also urged
OSHA to delay action until an EPA study on chromium’s cancer risk had been completed. When
the study showed cancer risks, industry interests urged further delays and more analysis.

84 See generally Int’l Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Chromium, Nickel and Welding, 49
IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans (1990), available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/
ENG/Monographs/vol49/mono49.pdf.
85 Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Toxicological
Profile for Chromium 1–8 (2012), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp7.pdf.
86 Notice, First Annual Report on Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,372 (Sept. 16, 1980); see also IARC, supra note 84 (explaining
that hexavalent chromium was identified in the IARC monographs as a known human carcinogen in 1973, and supplementing the
monograph with new evidence in support of the original classification).
87 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, IRIS Toxicological Review of Hexavalent Chromium (1998), available at
http://www.epa.gov/iris/toxreviews/0144tr.pdf.
88 Air Contaminants, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 tbl. Z-1 (1999). Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 14647, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26778 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2002) (explaining that OSHA’s 1971 standard for hexavalent chromium was
based on a recommended standard by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1943. ANSI’s standard followed from
reports from the 1920’s about hexavalent chromium’s acute effects).
89 Nat’l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Pub. No. 76-129, Criteria for a
Recommended Standard: Occupational Exposure to Chromium (VI) (1975), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
docs/1970/76-129.html.
90 Occupational Safety and Health Law § 13 (Randy S. Rabinowitz & Scott H. Durham eds., 2d ed. Supp. 2008). OSHA
had attempted to set a new standard for chromium-6 as part of a cumulative carcinogen standard in 1977, but the Supreme Court
invalidated the OSHA rulemaking, finding that the agency must perform an individual risk assessment for each chemical standard
it develops. See David Michaels, Doubt is Their Product: How Industry’s Assault on Science Threatens Your Health
97–100 (2008).
91 Michaels, supra note 90, at 100–01; David Michaels et al., Commentary, Selected Science: An Industry Campaign to
Undermine an OSHA Hexavalent Chromium Standard, Envtl. Health: A Global Access Sci. Source 2 (2006), available at http://
www.ehjournal.net/content/pdf/1476-069X-5-5.pdf.
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As the debate over the cancer risks of inhaling chromium-6 progressed, another battle
opened up. The movie Erin Brockovich, which premiered in 2000, described the struggle of
residents of Hinkley, CA, to get compensation from Pacific Gas & Electric after it contaminated
the town’s drinking water with chromium, making many residents ill. The case settled for $333
million in 1993, making it the largest class-action in U.S. history at the time.92
By 2010, an NTP study showed that ingestion of drinking water contaminated with
hexavalent chromium caused cancer in laboratory animals,93 and staff at EPA believed there
was enough information to calculate a reference concentration (maximum exposure level) for
chromium ingestion. If EPA was able to do this, new drinking water standards for chromium
levels nationwide would likely follow.
Industry objected,94 arguing that chromium is metabolized by humans into a less toxic
form of the metal, thus posing minimal cancer risk from drinking water. Their “evidence” was
a 1997 re-analysis (shown to be fraudulent in 200595) of a 1987 Chinese study.96 The American
Chemistry Council’s Hexavalent Chromium Panel, the apparent successor to the Chrome
Coalition, led the objections, urging EPA to delay its IRIS assessment until an industry-funded
study had been completed.97 Since October 2010, the American Chemistry Council has filed 25
separate comments objecting to the IRIS assessment of hexavalent chromium – almost half of
the total number of comments filed.98 EPA bowed to industry pressure and agreed to indefinitely
delay its IRIS assessment.99

92 Sedina Banks, The “Erin Brockovich Effect”: How Media Shapes Toxics Policy, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 219, 230
(2003). In 2003, Honeywell International, Inc., was ordered to pay $400 million for cleanup of chromium in New Jersey. Rebecca
Sutton, Environmental Working Group, Chromium-6 in U.S. Tap Water 17 (2010), available at http://static.ewg.org/
reports/2010/chrome6/chrome6_report_2.pdf. A similar class action suit was filed against Honeywell & PPG Industries in 2010.
Smith v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-03345, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51854 (D.N.J. May 13, 2011).
93 Nat’l Toxicology Program, NTP TR 546, Technical Report on the Toxicology and Carcinogenesis Studies of
Sodium Dichromate Dihydrate (CAS No. 7789-12-0) in F344/N Rats and B6C3F1 Mice (Drinking Water Studies) (July
2008), http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/htdocs/LT_rpts/tr546.pdf; Press Release, Nat’l Institute of Health, Hexavalent Chromium in
Drinking Water Causes Cancer in Lab Animals (May 16, 2007), http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/may2007/niehs-16.htm.
94 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Docket Folder, Draft Toxicological Review of Chromium:
In Support of Summary Information on the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), EPA-HQ-ORD-2010-0540,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;D=EPA-HQ-ORD-2010-0540 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
95 Id. As a result of the fraudulent study, the Journal pulled it from publication and issued a letter regarding the incident. P.
Brandt-Rauf, Editorial Retraction, Cancer Mortality in a Chinese Population Exposed to Hexavalent Chromium in Water, 48(7) J.
Occupational & Envtl. Medicine 749 (2006).
96 See Environmental Working Group, Chrome-Plated Fraud: How PG&E’s Scientists-For-Hire Reversed Findings
of Cancer Study (2005), http://www.ewg.org/book/export/html/8626.
97 Letter from Ann Mason, Senior Director, Am. Chemistry Council, to Rebecca Clark, Acting Director, Nat’l Ctr.
for Envtl. Assessment, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 23, 2010), available at http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-ORD-2010-0540-0027 (select the pdf icon by “view attachment” to download the attached
file). American Chemistry Council’s Hexavalent Chromium Panel funded this new, $4 million study, which was conducted by
Tox Strategies and a team of scientists with ties to industry. According to ACC’s website, “The panel’s primary activities include
sponsoring research to fill the scientific database informing the risk levels for hexavalent chromium in drinking water and
communicating the findings of this research.” Hexavalent Chromium, AmericanChemistry.com, http://www.americanchemistry.
com/HexavalentChromium. ACC also began a letter writing campaign from industry organizations to EPA asking the agency
to delay its assessment until the new industry study is complete. See, e.g., E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Kevin L. Bromberg
(Sept. 15, 2011) (attaching several letters from trade associations all asking EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to postpone the IRIS
assessment of chromium until ACC completes its ongoing research project and EPA has had an opportunity to consider the data).
98

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Docket Folder, supra note 94.

99 IRISTrack Detailed Report: Chromium VI Assessment Milestones and Dates, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, http://cfpub.epa.
gov/ncea/iristrac/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewChemical.showChemical&sw_id=1114 (last updated Jan. 8, 2013).
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Advocacy Involvement
The Office of Advocacy became involved in the debate about the cancer risks of ingesting
chromium after being contacted by the same ACC lobbyist who had urged Advocacy to become
involved in the debate about formaldehyde risks.100 In June 2011, the lobbyist suggested Advocacy
staff write a letter to EPA asking that it delay completion of the chromium assessment until after
the ACC study had been completed.101 The request did not mention any small business concerns.
Advocacy did not attempt to research or validate the ACC’s position on chromium. Staff
at the Office of Advocacy did ask if there was evidence showing a link between chromium-laced
drinking water and cancer and was assured that new industry-funded research would answer
these questions.102 This apparently satisfied Advocacy staff.103
Staff at the Office of Advocacy also asked if any small businesses were affected by the
chromium risk assessment. ACC assured Advocacy that they were, and Advocacy staff asked
no more questions.104 No small business contacted the Office of Advocacy to challenge the IRIS
chromium assessment. A few small businesses filed comments with EPA on the IRIS chromium
assessment, echoing the comments already filed by ACC asking EPA to delay the IRIS assessment
until after completion of ACC’s new study.
On Oct. 5, 2011, Advocacy submitted a letter to EPA expressing the concerns of “small
business representatives” over EPA’s IRIS evaluation that hexavalent chromium is carcinogenic.105
The Office of Advocacy went on to claim that EPA did not have sufficient data to estimate the
risk from ingestion of chromium and argued that EPA should not rely on a linear model to
estimate the cancer risks of exposure to low doses of chromium. The Office asked EPA to delay
its final assessment until a new industry study was completed and its results incorporated into the
assessment.
100 E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Bruce E. Lundegrun (Feb. 3, 2011) (“May I impose on you to help arrange a meeting
with your Advocacy Office colleagues who handle environmental issues? The Senate EPW Committee held a hearing on drinking
water contaminants yesterday at which Administrator Jackson testified. My interest in setting up the meeting has been raised
substantially as a result of her testimony. As you may recall, I represent the American Chemistry Council’s Hexavalent Chromium
Panel, and Cr6 was one of the topics of the hearing.”).
101 E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Kevin L. Bromberg (June 28, 2011) (“I would like you to be aware EPA’s Cr6 risk
assessment is moving forward apparently without waiting for ACC’s MOA and PK studies to be completed and accepted
for publication, notwithstanding the agency’s own peer reviewers strong recommendation. NFIB recently sent a letter to
Administrator Jackson calling upon her to stop the Cr6 risk assessment process to do exactly as EPA’s peer reviewers deemed
advisable. . . .Since it appears EPA needs to hear from more constituents for it to listen to its own peer review team, would SBA be
willing to send a letter to Ms. Jackson to weigh in on this matter?”).
102 E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Jeff Hannapel, Steve Via, and Randy Schumacher (Feb. 25, 2011) (“Birnbaum told the
committee that studies, other than EWG, have found a ‘statistically significant association between hexavalent chromium in
drinking water and cancer.’ Does anyone have these studies , or the references to these studies?”); E-mail from Randy Schumacher
to Kevin L. Bromberg (Feb. 25, 2011) (“ACC’s research is examining why this occurs and whether Cr6 at low doses (consistent
with existing drinking water standards) has the same carcinogenic effects and mode if [sic] action. . . .”).
103 E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Randy Schumacher (Feb. 25, 2011) (“thx.”) (responding to chain of e-mails on the
association between hexavalent chromium in drinking water and cancer).
104 E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Ann Mason and Randal Schumacher (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Since this is the oral ingestion
standard, is this toxicological review even relevant to platers, like NAMF? Isn’t that only inhalation risk – and a separate risk
assessment, that I believe is under development? Isn’t this review solely of interest to drinking water suppliers?”). Reply e-mail
from Ann Mason to Kevin L. Bromberg and Randal Schumacher (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Yes the oral tox review will impact drinking
water systems AND will impact all cleanup and possible effluent standards. So the industries interested in the Cr6 oral tox review
include all of the Cr6 user industries, including all industries that do plating or use chromium.”).
105

Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office
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The ACC lobbyist provided the Office of Advocacy with these talking points and edited its
draft letter to EPA.106 Advocacy’s final letter to EPA precisely mirrors the text forwarded to it by
the ACC and is remarkably similar to ACC’s comments to EPA.107

of Advocacy, to Paul Anastas, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.sba.gov/
advocacy/816/27201.
106 See E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Kevin L. Bromberg (Sept. 15, 2011) (attaching several letters from trade associations
all asking EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to postpone the IRIS assessment of chromium until ACC completes its ongoing
research project and EPA has had an opportunity to consider the data); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Ann Mason and Randy
Schumacher (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Ann, Randy – a question on Cr 6: ‘Initial results show that Cr(VI) is not mutagenic at low [ ] and
that the human stomach has a substantial ability to reduce Cr(VI) to the benign chromium-3. Confirmation of a threshold would
mean that there is no cancer risk at low doses, contrary to the current EPA model.’ Would you edit these sentences – or is this
accurate?”); E-mail from Randy Schumacher to Ann Mason (Oct. 3, 2011) (providing his suggested edits to Kevin Bromberg’s
text); E-mail from Ann Mason to Randal Schumacher and Kevin L. Bromberg (Oct. 3, 2011) (“This text is ok with me as edited
by Randy. Note that some of the EPA peer reviewers were particularly emphatic about this point. Kevin, did you want/need to
include a quote from them?”); E-mail from Kevin L. Bromberg to Randal Schumacher and Ann Mason (Oct. 3, 2011) (“Can you
get some good quotes from scientists not named in the NRDC letter? Also, is there a good argument about the gastric issue that
you could offer?”).
107 Letter from Winslow Sargeant, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Sarah Bresolin Silver, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office
of Advocacy, to Paul Anastas, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.sba.gov/
advocacy/816/27201; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Docket Folder, supra note 94.
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4. Did the Office of Advocacy’s Actions Really Serve the
Interests of Small Businesses?
Like most Americans, we
believe a vibrant small business
sector supports a more resilient
economy. The assistance the
Small Business Administration
provides to small business owners
is an important public service,
increasingly so when markets are
dominated by large corporations.
The mission of the Office of
Advocacy is to ensure that other
federal agencies consider small
business concerns.
However, this investigation reveals that, rather than aligning its mission with the work
of other federal agencies, the Office of Advocacy actually worked with large business interests to
obstruct and delay the work of at least two agencies tasked with protecting the health and safety
of the American people. One part of government should not be working to undermine the efforts
of another.
The correspondence into and out of the Office of Advocacy that we have examined
paints a picture of a federal agency extremely responsive to the agenda of trade associations
dominated by big chemical manufacturers and their lobbyists. No small business asked the Office
of Advocacy to intervene with the NTP Report on Carcinogens or the EPA IRIS assessments of
cancer risks. Advocacy’s comments on these assessments offered no small business perspective to
NTP or IRIS. No small business filed an independent comment critical of the formaldehyde and
styrene assessments; a few small businesses did comment on the chromium assessment. In each
case, the Office of Advocacy made no attempt to determine whether the views of the American
Chemistry Council, the American Composite Manufacturers Association, or the Formaldehyde
Council actually represented the views or interests of small businesses.
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The Office of Advocacy’s close coordination of its efforts with lobbyists seeking legislation
to obtain the same results suggests its staff engaged in impermissible lobbying. Advocacy’s efforts
to block the NTP and IRIS assessments were initiated by the American Chemistry Council and
groups or lobbyists associated with it. ACC is made up of 140 chemical companies; it claims that
70 of its members are “small and medium sized businesses” but doesn’t specify what it means
by “small” or “medium.” Its membership is dominated by the largest chemical companies in the
country, including Dow, DuPont, Exxon Mobil, Georgia-Pacific, and more. Its federal lobbying
expenditures in the fourth quarter of 2011 were the fifth highest of any group filing lobbying
reports. Its Formaldehyde Panel is funded by Georgia-Pacific and Hexion, both large companies.
Dow is a major player in both ACC and the Styrene Information and Research Council. ACC’s
Chromium Panel succeeded the Chrome Coalition. There is no evidence of any small business
role in any of the ACC coalitions.
This is not surprising since small businesses do not share the anti-regulatory views of large
chemical companies. A survey by the American Sustainable Business Council concluded that:
Organizations like the American Chemistry Council have made antiregulation legislation in Congress and state legislatures a top priority,
pushing the myth that all regulations are a threat to small business growth
. . . . But the reality is that small business owners see the value of sound
regulations to help guide the market to deliver innovation for safer
chemicals and products, which consumers are demanding. This data shows
that no matter what your political affiliation is, there is agreement that
toxic chemicals need to be regulated to prevent risk for business and the
public.108
Even the Office of Advocacy’s own research shows that challenging cancer assessments is
simply not a priority of actual small business owners. According to an initiative to identify the
interest of small business (referred to as the r3 initiative109), the top regulatory issues of concern
to small business related to their ability to compete against large businesses for government
contracts; EPA rules, particularly its “Once in, Always in” policy,110 were also a concern.
Advocacy received no nominations related to scientific assessments.111
108 Toxic Chemical Reform Good for Business—New Poll, American Sustainable Business Council (ASBC) (Nov. 13, 2012),
http://asbcouncil.org/node/845.
109 Small Business Regulatory Review and Reform Initiative, SBA Office of Advocacy, http://archive.sba.gov/advo/r3/. The r3
Initiative began under Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Tom Sullivan, but did not continue after he resigned in 2008. The initiative
was designed to allow small businesses to nominate rules for review, which Advocacy would then review and publish as a top ten
list in its annual RFA report. Post Hearing Questions and Answers for the Record Submitted to Sen. Olympia Snowe by Winslow
Sargeant, Jan.25, 2011 (Next Steps for Main Street: Reducing the Regulatory and Administrative Burdens on America’s Small
Businesses: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship (Nov. 18, 2010)), available at http://
www.sba.gov/advocacy/2675/14163; see also New Small Business Program Will Influence Agency Regulatory Reviews, OMB Watch
(Sept. 11, 2007), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3419.
110 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Potential to Emit for MACT Standards -- Guidance on Timing
Issues (May 16, 1995) for an explanation of the Once in, Always in air quality policy, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/caaa/t3/memoranda/
pteguid.pdf.
111 Regulatory Review and Reform (r3) Top 10 Rules, 2008 in Report on the Regulatory Flexibility Act FY 2007: Annual
Report of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy on Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive
Order 13272, at Appx. B (2008), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/07regflx.pdf; Regulatory Review and
Reform (r3) Top 10 Rules, 2009, SBA Office of Advocacy, http://archive.sba.gov/advo/r3/r3_nominations09.html#10. Although
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Moreover, testimony at a recent joint hearing of the House Science Committee and
Small Business Committee112 suggests that small businesses may in fact benefit from stricter
regulation of some toxic substances, because the prohibition of some chemicals may open up new
markets for those who manufacture “green” substitutes. The Vice President of BioAmber, Ally
Latourelle, stated in her testimony that “recognition that styrene is ‘reasonably anticipated’ to be
carcinogenic is not detrimental to our small business. In fact, for our business, as an alternative
to petrochemicals, and the developers of non-toxic styrene replacement products, reports
published by government on the toxicology of chemicals and regulations of those chemicals is
a driver to our business as well as our strategic partners in the area of chemical production and
manufacturing.”113 Apparently, the Office of Advocacy never inquired about these issues.

Advocacy’s website indicated that it was accepting nominations until December 31, 2010 for its 2011 r3 initiative, the r3 Top Ten
list has not been published in the RFA since 2009.
112 Hearing on Report on Carcinogens, supra note 82 (statement of Ally Latourelle, Vice President, Gov’t Affairs, BioAmber,
Inc.).
113

Id.
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5. Conclusions
The Regulatory Flexibility Act assigns to the Office of Advocacy responsibility for
ensuring that federal agencies evaluate the impacts on small businesses of the rules they adopt.
Cancer risk assessments are not covered by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. They do not regulate
small business. The Office of Advocacy had no reasonable basis for becoming involved in the
NTP or IRIS assessments.
The Office of Advocacy’s decision to comment on technical, scientific assessments
represents a significant and unwarranted expansion of its role and extends its reach well beyond
the regulatory process. By its own admission, Advocacy lacks the scientific expertise to evaluate
the merits of the NTP/IRIS assessments. Advocacy’s comments on these assessments raised
no issues of specific concern to small business but relied almost exclusively on talking points
provided by trade associations engaged in major lobbying campaigns.
Between 2005 and 2012, the American Chemistry Council and its members spent more
than $333 million lobbying Congress and federal agencies.114 The Formaldehyde Institute/
Council, Styrene Industry Research Council, and Chrome Coalition spent millions of dollars in a
protracted lobbying campaign to prevent government agencies from designating these substances
as carcinogenic and tens of millions more on research carefully designed to support their claims
that these substances do not cause cancer in humans. These groups asked the Office of Advocacy
for assistance, and the Office became a willing partner in these lobbying efforts.
The Office of Advocacy’s efforts to block the NTP and IRIS assessments came amid
efforts by the ACC to win congressional approval of legislation overhauling the NTP and IRIS
assessment processes. Both ACC and Dow Chemical lobbied Congress to delay publication
of the Report on Carcinogens until the National Academy of Sciences conducted yet another
review.115 Rep. Denny Rehberg (R-MT) unsuccessfully pushed an appropriations rider to do just
that.116
Besides the moral and ethical concerns raised by efforts to keep substances known
to cause cancer on the market and in wide use, the activities of the Office of Advocacy are
disturbing because they may be illegal. Civil and criminal laws bar federal employees from
lobbying. While the Government Accountability Office admits that lobbying restrictions are
“unclear and imprecise,” the Comptroller General has said anti-lobbying laws prohibit providing
“administrative support for teh [sic] lobbying activities of private organizations.”117
114 Jeremy P. Jacobs, Industry Group Boosted Political Spending Last Year – And it Paid Off, E&E Daily (Feb. 7, 2012), http://
www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2012/02/07/1.
115

See Sass, supra note 47.

116

Committee on Appropriations, supra note 48.

117 U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/T-OGC-96-18, Testimony Before the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives: H.R. 3078, The Federal Agency Anti-Lobbying Act; Statement of
Robert P. Murphy, General Counsel, General Accounting Office (1996), available at http://gao.justia.com/departmentof-the-interior/1996/5/h-r-3078-the-federal-agency-anti-lobbying-act-t-ogc-96-18/T-OGC-96-18-full-report.pdf; Lobbying and
Publicity or Propaganda Guidelines: Appropriations Act Riders, Nat’l Institute Of Health Ethics Program, http://ethics.od.nih.gov/
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Our investigation raises serious questions about the lack of oversight of the Office of
Advocacy’s actions. The Office’s activities are not reviewed by the administrator of the Small
Business Administration or the White House. Congress has conducted no oversight hearings on
the Office in more than 25 years, and GAO has not investigated the Office’s activities.

Specific Findings and Recommendations
The Office of Advocacy submitted comments regarding three widely used chemicals, objecting
to cancer assessments by the National Toxicology Program and the Environmental Protection
Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System, even though no federal regulation was at stake.
These actions were not authorized by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and improperly expanded the
Office of Advocacy’s jurisdiction into areas in which it has no expertise.
 Recommendation: The Office of Advocacy should limit its work to regulatory activities
affecting small business, as authorized by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and subsequent laws.
The Office of Advocacy hosts regular Environmental Roundtables attended by trade association
representatives and lobbyists. The discussions and minutes are kept secret, although the
consensus positions that emerge appear to inform the Office of Advocacy’s policy positions.
These meetings violate the spirit, and perhaps the letter, of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
 Recommendation: Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the Office of Advocacy’s
Environmental Roundtables violate Federal Advisory Committee Act provisions.
The Office of Advocacy staff made no effort to educate themselves on the science underlying
the debates about the cancer risks of these chemicals or to verify the accuracy of the talking
points provided to them by industry lobbyists before filing comments critical of the NTP/IRIS
processes and the scientific conclusions in each assessment.118 Instead, the Office of Advocacy
simply repackaged and submitted talking points provided by trade association lobbyists as formal
comments.
 Recommendation: The Office of Advocacy should independently verify the factual claims
it makes in comments to other federal agencies and should not comment on technical or
scientific matters on which its staff have no expertise.

topics/Lobby-Publicity-Guide.htm#Footnote (last updated Feb. 18, 2011). A 2009 investigation condemned the activities of a
small unit inside the Department of Interior where communication between government staff and external parties “created the
potential for conflicts of interest or violations of law.” Rep. Rob Bishop (R-Utah) who had called for the investigation responded:
“The ongoing, explicit, far-reaching coordination between special interest lobbying groups and [government staff] . . . is troubling
. . . . This inappropriate meddling of private and public lobbying efforts is precisely the sort of thing I warned against . . . .” Bruce
Hosking, Role of BLM Employees Questioned in Federal Investigation, Examiner.com (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/
article/role-of-blm-employees-questioned-federal-investigation.
118 In each of these cases (formaldehyde, styrene, and chromium), other federal agencies like OSHA, NIOSH, ATSDR also
extensively reviewed their cancer risks. The Office of Advocacy made no effort to even compare the NTP or IRIS assessments to
the work of other federal agencies.
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Correspondence between the Office of Advocacy and trade associations dominated by large
chemical companies and their lobbyists suggests the Office became entangled in a major lobbying
campaign to prevent the federal government from listing certain chemicals as known or probable
carcinogens. E-mails suggest the Office of Advocacy may have violated the Anti-Lobbying Act
and other lobbying restrictions.
 Recommendation: Congress should ask GAO to investigate whether the activities of the
Office of Advocacy represent impermissible lobbying by federal employees.
No small businesses objected to the scientific assessments or asked the Office of Advocacy
to intervene in the cancer assessments. The Office of Advocacy made no effort to determine
whether the positions it took represented small business views and interests. Moreover, since
small businesses may produce substitutes for toxic chemicals, a cancer finding for existing
chemicals could open up new markets for substitute chemicals produced by small businesses.
 Recommendation: The Office of Advocacy should develop procedures to verify that its
policies represent the interests of small business. Its comments should be limited to offering a
small business perspective that the regulating agency would not otherwise hear.
No process or procedures seem to be in place to ensure that the activities of the Office of
Advocacy are consistent with, and do not work to undermine, the statutory responsibilities of
other agencies.
 Recommendation: Congress should exert more rigorous oversight over the Office of
Advocacy to ensure its work does not delay or prevent other federal agencies from fulfilling
their statutory goals, especially those scientific and regulatory agencies tasked with protecting
the health of the American people.
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